


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6 DECEMBER 1991



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Personal Relationships in Foreign Ministry

92BA0174A Athens TO VIMA TIS KIRIAKIS in Greek
17 Nov 91 p A21

[Article by N. Marakis: "An Armchair for Three"]

[Text] Within the past few days, the political leadership in the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been restructured with the assignment of Messrs. Stefan Tafrov and Vladimir Filipov to be at the side of Minister Stoyan Ganev. This trio must perform an exceptionally difficult task. It is assuming its duties at a time of crisis in the Balkans, while, at the same time, Bulgaria is seeking a new impetus. It will have to provide answers to questions such as the future of Sofia's relations with the European Community, its priorities particularly with regard to Greece and Turkey, and the role that Bulgaria will, in the long run, assume in the region.

Mr. Ganev is younger than the others; he is just 36 years old. He came into the field of diplomacy from the legal sciences field. In fact, he was a teacher at the police school. The head of the United Democratic Center (that belongs to the government coalition, the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]) is considered to be one of those who "could talk to Americans and Russians." In his relations with the two others, he is helped by the fact that he did his postgraduate work in Moscow, where he defended his dissertation "Leninist Precepts of Law," and the fact that his wife is Russian.

Mr. Ganev was considered one of the closest associates of Mr. Zhelyu Zhelev, when the current president of Bulgaria was still head of the SDS. Internal changes in the presidential entourage last year led to his being withdrawn from the preeminent position he occupied, but he never did break with Mr. Zhelev. However, no one knows what the future holds because his relationship with Mr. Dimitur Ludzhev is exceptionally bad. The present defense minister is one of the strongest political opponents of the foreign affairs minister and is considered primarily responsible for Mr. Ganev's being kept out of Mr. Zhelev's "close circle."

Mr. Tafrov belongs to Mr. Zhelev's immediate close entourage and was, in fact, his personal diplomatic adviser, even though he did not have any previous training or experience in matters of international policy. Prior to the elections, he had been appointed ambassador to Rome, but he never did assume his duties there. He is now saddled with the responsibility for handling diplomatic personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and for its restructuring. His name has very often come up at the negotiating table of the SDS parties in regard to the position of foreign affairs minister.

He is considered one of the "toughest" defenders of a reorientation of Bulgarian foreign policy. One of his basic positions, which he developed recently, is that there is an "imbalance" in Sofia's relations with Athens and Ankara. In his opinion, priority should be given to Turkey rather than to Greece. He was one of the most persistent critics of the recent cooperation agreement between Greece and Bulgaria. An impulsive personality with many eccentricities, he will constitute one of the most important factors in

the shaping of Bulgarian tactics on international issues. Most diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs already consider him "the eye of the president."

Mr. Filipov comes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has assumed, among other things, the management of Mr. Ganev's diplomatic office. He is the only one of the three who has diplomatic and technical training, having taken special courses at the Institute of International Relations in Moscow and at the Soviet Diplomatic Academy. Before the elections, he held the position of diplomatic adviser to the SDS and also was one of the candidates for the position of deputy foreign affairs minister. Among the three, he is considered closest to Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov.

At the same time, Mr. Filipov incites the strongest kind of opposition within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially because a few months ago he publicly put out a list of names of diplomats he considered to be "members of the communist *nomenklatura*" that was described as a "black-list." He belongs to the school of "multidimensional foreign policy," even though he is considered in Sofia to be more moderate than Mr. Tafrov. He is also said to understand the importance of the European Community for Bulgaria and to seek ways of associating his country with the developing processes of European integration.

A balance among these three political personalities will not be easy. In Sofia, Mr. Ganev's intraparty opponents have started circulating rumors—just a week after he assumed his duties—to the effect that the new foreign affairs minister will be "susceptible" to pressures of "the diplomatic establishment and the Communists" and will not be able to complete the task he was assigned. The most daring persons do not hesitate to describe Mr. Ganev as a "minister under restriction" and "controlled" by Mr. Tafrov, who "will be the real behind-the-scenes foreign affairs minister." Besides, both Mr. Ganev and Mr. Tafrov are about the same age. Both have exceptionally strong political ambition, and each has his own approach to the summit of power in Bulgaria.

In Sofia, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs is now facing a new reality, with new faces in key positions that will become more numerous as changes in Bulgarian diplomatic personnel move forward. Nevertheless, a few of the communications channels formed in previous years now seem to be dysfunctional, although little effort would be needed for their reestablishment, and their reactivation could prove to be valuable in the long run. Besides, experience will teach Sofia that a steady improvement in Greek-Bulgarian relations serves, in the best possible way, its very own interests.

Composition of National Assembly Commissions

92P20070A Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian No 96, 22 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[Decision of the 36th National Assembly adopted on 14 November and signed by National Assembly Chairman Stefan Savov: "Decision on the Membership of the Permanent Commissions of the National Assembly"]

[Text] In accordance with Article 4, Paragraph 1 of the Temporary Rules of Procedure for the National Assembly, in connection with Article 79, Paragraph 1 and Article 86, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the National Assembly has made the following decision regarding the membership of the permanent commissions of the National Assembly:

1. The Economic Commission will consist of 27 national representatives, of whom 13 will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, 11 from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and three from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
2. The Commission on Control over Income, Expenditures, and Property of the Political Parties will consist of 15 national representatives, of whom seven will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, six from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
3. The Commission on Youth, Sports, and Tourism will consist of 12 national representatives, of whom six will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, five from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and one from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
4. The Commission on the Administrative and Territorial System and Local Self-Government will consist of 21 national representatives, of whom 10 will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, nine from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
5. The Commission on Budget and Finance will consist of 17 national representatives, of whom eight will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, seven from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
6. The Commission on Religious Matters will consist of 11 national representatives, of whom five will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, four from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
7. The Commission on Foreign Policy will consist of 29 national representatives, of whom 14 will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, 12 from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and three from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
8. The Commission on Complaints, Suggestions, and Petitions by Citizens will consist of 11 national representatives, of whom five will be from the parliamentary group of

the Union of Democratic Forces, four from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.

9. The Commission on Health Care will consist of 17 national representatives, of whom eight will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, seven from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
10. The Commission on Agriculture will consist of 27 national representatives, of whom 13 will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, 11 from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and three from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
11. The Commission on Culture will consist of 21 national representatives, of whom 10 will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, nine from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
12. The Commission on Science and Education will consist of 27 national representatives, of whom 13 will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, 11 from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and three from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
13. The Commission on National Security will consist of 29 national representatives, of whom 14 will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, 12 from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and three from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
14. The Commission on the Environment will consist of 15 national representatives, of whom seven will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, six from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
15. The Commission on Human Rights will consist of 15 national representatives, of whom seven will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, six from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
16. The Commission on Radio and Television will consist of 17 national representatives, of whom eight will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, seven from the Parliamentary Union for Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.
17. The Commission on Labor and Social Security will consist of 17 national representatives, of whom eight will be from the parliamentary group of the Union of Democratic Forces, seven from the Parliamentary Union for

Social Democracy, and two from the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms.

SDS Candidate Blaga Dimitrova Interviewed

92P20071A Sofia BULGARIYA in Bulgarian
6 Nov 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Blaga Dimitrova, the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, vice presidential candidate, by Keti Dragneva; place and date not given: "I Want To Serve Bulgaria"]

[Text] [Dragneva] Mrs. Dimitrova, recently there have been reports in the press mentioning your name as a candidate for president of the Republic of Bulgaria.

[Dimitrova] You're the first person who has mentioned it to me. I have never striven to attain any post of any kind. My only desire is to serve Bulgaria. At the moment, I am concerned about the Pazardzhik electoral district, where I was elected as a national representative.

[Dragneva] To the best of my knowledge, you were also elected in the 24th Sofia City electoral district. What is the current situation?

[Dimitrova] For balloting, I chose Pazardzhik district, in view of the fact that in this district there are many things to be settled. The national representatives who have served thus far have hardly visited the district. I also find the district's town of Velingrad particularly attractive....

[Dragneva] What are you writing at the moment?

[Dimitrova] Apart from reports on my public activities, I am not writing anything at the moment—with the exception, that is, of poetry, which dominates my thoughts. Poetry is my very essence.

[Dragneva] But don't you think that you and your husband, Yordan Vasilev, have a debt to your readers—namely, the trilogy about [Bulgarian poetess] Elisaveta Bagryana, the third part of which has remained in suspense for 10 years?

[Dimitrova] Yes, the third part is still in manuscript form. From the time they returned it to us a number of years ago until today, no publisher has wanted it.... Of course, we would be delighted if the trilogy ever appeared in print.

[Dragneva] What do you think about young writers? Do you think that freedom and democracy will help them get started?

[Dimitrova] Yes, young people will be much happier than we have been because they will be able to publish everything that comes from their hearts.

[Dragneva] What would you wish for the Bulgarian people?

[Dimitrova] From my heart, I hope that they will always be free and creative in their own areas.

Interview With Prewar Legion Leader

92BA0111A Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 8 Oct 91 p 4

[Interview with Ivan Dochev, former leader of the national legion in Bulgaria, by Romyana Georgieva; place and date not given: "Ivan Dochev Has Not Changed"—first two paragraphs are OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK introduction]

[Text] The former leader of the national legion in Bulgaria still does not know whether his death sentences are valid.

He was sent here by the emigre organization Bulgarian National Front, of which he is honorable chairman. Before leaving, the 86-year-old Ivan Dochev held a press conference, an account of which was published in 10 U.S. newspapers. The goal was for the public there to know that he was leaving for Bulgaria and to be interested in him. For the same reason, he registered with the U.S. Embassy in Bulgaria. Immediately after his arrival, photographs and documents surfaced concerning criminal activity of the national legion, and about the meeting between their leader, Ivan Dochev, and Hitler and other highly placed Nazis. Let us hear his words. Dochev learned from abroad about the three death sentences given him by the war court. Are they actually still in force?

[Dochev] No one is able to tell me. Even President Zhelev's office, when I inquired, did not give me a concrete answer to the question of whether these death sentences are still valid, and whether, if I return, they will be enforced. The answer was that there was no danger in my returning to Bulgaria. I do not know how that was decided.

[Georgieva] Are you afraid?

[Dochev] Both in the old days, when we established the organization of the national legion, and until now, there has always been danger for my life. I feel, however, that the way events have developed in Bulgaria, the communists would be very stupid if they undertook anything against me.

[Georgieva] I did not have a political force in mind.

[Dochev] Danger always exists. It might not even be official; something could be staged. But I, who have led a fight against communism for more than half a century, feel that I have a duty to honor my obligation until the end. Perhaps this is the last time that I will come—because of my age.

[Georgieva] And why did you leave Bulgaria?

[Dochev] After 9 September, because of the established communist regime, which threatened my life and killed my brother and thousands of my friends from the organization, I no longer had any illusions and I left. Here I had been a law graduate, but in Heidelberg I studied and completed my doctorate in law. I could not wait 20 years for citizenship in Germany so I left for Canada. They did not allow me to go to the United States because of accusations by the communist government, which sent false reports about me. They even accused me of having organized the burning of live Jews in Plevna, in their camp. They said that as mayor of Silistra I had sent Jews to

the gas chambers. In Silistra, there was only one Jewish family, which lived across from us, and we were friends. The Americans conducted an investigation that lasted 15 years—so that they could establish that everything was untrue and issue me a visa to settle there as a political immigrant. I was married in Bulgaria, my wife died a long time ago, and I have no children. I have been married for 10 years to an American, who has the same convictions I do.

[Georgieva] And what are those convictions?

[Dochev] The same as they were 60 years ago. When we created the national legion and began our activities, we put nationalism, patriotism, and readiness to sacrifice self for the motherland in first place. We did not accept communism as an idea, a principle, or a system of government. Progress can exist when there is freedom and democracy, and when the nature of man is protected and acknowledged. In a sense, to have ownership, to follow one's interests, to have the opportunity to use one's talent.

[Georgieva] Do you feel any blame?

[Dochev] Absolutely none because, in the activities we engaged in, we did not commit any crimes, we did not kill anyone, we did not rob anyone, we did not harass anyone. We are not responsible for anything except expressing our opinions and rights in a parliamentary and democratic way.

[Georgieva] What is your attitude toward the national issue in Bulgaria?

[Dochev] I cannot speak for a Turkish minority but for Bulgarians of Turkish origin, who, as citizens, should have equal rights with the Bulgarians, to follow their religion, to have their associations. When it concerns participation in political life, then it must be on the basis of Bulgarian citizens with equal rights, who can organize themselves in one or another party, with a determined program. We support our brothers in Macedonia in their fight for independence. Of course, each must operate within the framework of the laws of the country—as we in the United States have organizations, clubs, churches, schools, newspapers. But, when it concerns a party, we would have to join one party or another for U.S. citizens.

[Georgieva] You said that you have come to support the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces]. Don't you think that, after the information that surfaced about your past, the effect would be the opposite?

[Dochev] At all costs, I want you to note that I have not come at the invitation of the SDS, but of old friends. I do not see another organized opposition except the SDS. The fact that the newspapers write articles against me is nothing new. They are not trying to smear me so much as to deter the opposition. If today I decided to support Dertliev, they would attempt to say that he has become a fascist, and only because he is part of their opposition. These articles in the newspapers will make the opposite impression because the people will understand that, if Ivan Dochev is not right and has no importance, who will bother with him? It means that here is a person who

represents fear for them. I even think that there are some people who would be startled from their sleep if they heard the name "Ivan Dochev" because they know me from before and know very well that none of the criminals, the murderers, the robbers, the terrorists in this country could expect that he would not be held responsible. We are not talking about terror, we are not talking about slaughter. We are talking about legal responsibility in relation to criminal acts. And we will do everything to make it that way.

Military Police Staffing, Tasks Described

92BA0107A Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 2 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Maj. Georgi Buchev and Capt. Krasen Buchkov: "Military Policemen With Beige Jackets and Crimson Chevrons"]

[Text] Present at the meeting at the TsVK [Central High Command] in connection with the announcement of the minister of defense's order on the reassignment of officers to the military police and on the decision regarding personnel and full dress were nearly 130 of the 159 officers who had placed in the competitive examinations. Announcement was made of the chiefs of MP [military policeman] sectors in the Ministry of Defense, the armed services, and large units, as well as the commanders of MP subunits.

Individual subunits, when in garrison, are subordinate to the authorized garrison commanders, who will be responsible for outfitting them with arms, equipment, and property and will govern military police activity locally.

The noncommissioned officers' examination will be held again at the Army sports school (orientation—purely practical), with requirements the same as for officers except for the test on technical training. Personnel performing the normal period of compulsory military service will be selected by commissions composed of the commanders of the armed services and large units (from the 1972 class first rota and second rota). So far, nearly 310 noncommissioned officers have submitted applications, but it is expected that the number thereof will swell in view of Army General Mutaftchiev's recommendation that the applications of all who meet the established criteria for admission (age under 28, height 170-190 cm), including reserve noncommissioned officers, be honored.

Until the new form of MP uniform is tailored (beginning of 1992), the military policemen will not differ very much from other personnel performing their normal periods of military service. At an impressive Army review, the uniform of the Army policemen was presented. It is the everyday one that all personnel wear, but with crimson-colored facing, piping, epaulets, and so forth. There are also special insignia on the sleeve. There are still no monograms. The cockade is in the process of development. The field uniform, which is the same for all Army personnel, will be received by 15 October and will be used until the end of the year. Then the special military uniform will be ready. It will be black, made of oil-treated fabric—cap with a visor, short sheepskin coat, gore, shoes. By

removing the sheepskin, the uniform becomes a fall-spring uniform, and, by removing the tunic, a summer uniform—a long- or short-sleeved jacket, beige in color, and crimson chevrons.

The basic weapon is the Kalashnikov submachine gun with collapsible buttstock, and, for officers, the Makarov pistol.

Special gear: auxiliary equipment same as that the national police use.

For troop transport control subunits: a blue light for a vehicle with a tarpaulin and a similar lamp for other coverings; a siren with three types of signals; a bullhorn; and batons for stopping and regulating traffic.

Personnel will pass through two stages of training. The first is the initial stage, and the second is in the course of performing functional duties. The training process will be conducted in accordance with a specially devised program.

There will be two groups of training disciplines: combine-arms—regulations, drill manual, physical training, and mostly hand-to-hand combat, and so forth; and purely specialized disciplines—combat arts, firefighter training, troop transport control, operational and tactical training, administrative activity, and so forth.

On 25 September, a working meeting with the chief of the national policy, Colonel Milcho Bengarski, was held, at which readiness was expressed on the part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to help and cooperate in the initial MP training, with its equipment and physical plant.

The initial training will terminate by 30 December, while actual performance of functional duties will begin on 2 January, and the training program for the year will get under way.

The functions of the military police are mainly the following: preserving discipline and internal order in the garrison; combating violence among service personnel; patrolling the garrison; regulating road traffic during a troop movement; participating in preventive measures resulting in the elimination of preconditions for violations; protecting important facilities when necessary and escorting military delegations; escorting service personnel who have committed crimes; tracing weapons and service personnel who have evaded military service, and conducting an initial investigation. In wartime: safeguarding and escorting prisoners; assisting subunits that have lost their bearings; combating diversionary and espionage groups; tracing deserters....

In his concluding address, the defense minister declared that, in the competitive examinations and in the appointment of officers to MP positions, the intrusion of the subjective factor in the ratings had been reduced to a minimum: first, because employment in this new military institution is an honor and a duty for everyone; second, because the military police, in no small degree, will determine the image of the Army and of the armed forces in general; and, third, because of the especially effective operations of the command authorities. That is why, in

fact, the military police are a substantial reason for the strengthening of discipline in the Army and the elevation of its prestige.

Curious Figures and Facts

- Auxiliary equipment and clothing have been contracted for with supplier firms, but, for the purpose, \$200,000 plus as much in Bulgarian leva will be needed.
- By 1 January 1992, special patrol wagons will be delivered, and, by 30 January, three GAZ-66-based buses, as well. For arms and equipment, \$600,000 and 400,000 leva will be required.

The officer and noncommissioned officer personnel of the military police will receive a remuneration per rank and position 10-percent higher than the personnel in the troops. Officer ranks in the military police are one degree higher, and NCO's will have an opportunity to become master sergeants, but, as against this, there is no guarantee of more dynamic promotion in positions and ranks.

- Of the officers appointed, 104 have had military academy, 12 have had three-year military academy, four have gone to the ShZO [Reserve Officers School], and four have attended the NSA [National Sports Academy]. The distribution by rank is as follows: lieutenants 17, senior lieutenants 38, captains 32, majors 30, lieutenant colonels 10.
- Not only the service personnel of the Bulgarian Army but also all who wear a military uniform (Construction Troops, troops of the Ministry of Transport and the Committee on Informatics and Communications) will be subordinate to the military police.

Decentralizing Military Supply System

92BA0108A Sofia BULGARSKA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
9 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Major General Lyuben Pekhlianov, first deputy and chief of staff of the Materiel-Supply and Rear-Services Command of the Bulgarian Army, by Captain Plamen Grigorov; place and date not given: "How To Decentralize Supply When Money Is Short"]

[Text] Will anything change in the organization of the Bulgarian Army's materiel supply and rear services under market-economy conditions? This is the question that not only worries but also puts most commanders to trouble today. Major Ivan Toshev makes his suggestion by way of experiment. Can we, however, make a complete change-over to decentralized supply? What hinders us, and why is this impossible at this stage? A representative of the editors interviewed Major General Lyuben Pikhlianov about these questions.

[Grigorov] General, sir, back a year ago you raised for the first time the question of the necessity of decentralized Army supply. What has been done thus far?

[Pekhlianov] A wide circle of specialists are working along these lines. At the moment, the prescriptive documents are being drawn up and will be finished as soon as

possible. Without these, no change whatsoever is possible. We have no intention of repeating old mistakes of embarking upon something new without advance preparation and investigation of others' experience. At present, we are studying that of the Greek and Polish Armies, and this month we're going to familiarize ourselves with the Austrian Army's experience. We shall use what most closely approximates our conditions. We have at our disposal official prescriptive documents establishing the Greek Army's supply method under market-economy conditions. We shall use what is best, and, as I've already said, shortly the prescriptive documents will be drawn up that will establish the system and mechanism of bidding, contract letting, and so forth. These prescriptive documents will meet market-economy conditions.

[Grigorov] Apart from the lack of prescriptive documents, are there any other reasons that our changeover to decentralized supply is being held up?

[Pekhlivanov] Unfortunately, there are. And the most important of these is that our market economy is not yet fully developed, and we continue to live under shortage conditions. The market is unstable, and, latent in it, are some quite unpleasant surprises. Certain enterprises and organizations still have a supply monopoly. And the worst thing is that, given the lack of serious competition, the market mechanism is developing on the basis of speculative trade. What do you imagine would happen given this speculative trading, without the centralized information such as we have built up here at the KMTTO [Materiel-Supply and Rear-Services Command] of the Bulgarian Army? This information enables us to make purchases only at the lowest possible prices at the moment. But what would happen if every unit went shopping on its own? The prices in one region would be one thing, and, in another, completely different. In other words, as of right now, we would put the individual commanders in an unequal position. We would create conditions for money to be wasted and, to some extent, even for service personnel to be involved in speculative deals.

[Grigorov] Are there perhaps also in this situation objective reasons having to do with the maintenance and refurbishing of wartime reserves of materiel?

[Pekhlivanov] Yes, this is indeed precisely so and is another important reason that compels us not to be hasty but to interpret matters in all their aspects. In our central depots, we maintain considerable reserves that, in due course, are going to have to be refurbished. But this is done

in large lots—urgently and with veterinary and medical supervision organized at the very time of the receipt thereof.

Regardless of this, however, we shall proceed to the decentralization of supply. And everything that we can do at the present stage to decentralize, we have already endeavored to.

[Grigorov] This means that for units to be able to look out for themselves and shop for themselves, they must have financial resources at their disposal. Is it within the capability of the Ministry of Defense to provide the minimum of these resources in the present situation?

[Pekhlivanov] I'll be repeating myself perhaps, but the main trouble is that we're compelled to live under conditions of a shortage of budgetary resources. At the moment, we're providing the Army, on a priority basis, only with money for pay and rations and, to some extent, with fuels and lubricants. In other words, all the things the Army could not live without. The state is hard put to it to meet the updated 1991 budget in full, and we have no choice but to bear this in mind.

[Grigorov] The situation is indeed serious, but, still, aren't these all the obstacles in the way of decentralization?

[Pekhlivanov] Of course not. When we talk about complete decentralization in Army supply, we must in no event forget that a considerable part of the MTS [materiel supply] is not an element in the market. It results solely from our central ordering. And this holds true not only for arms and equipment; it encompasses, as well, some service-area property with special military purpose.

[Grigorov] Yet, despite all these reasons and obstacles, you continue to assert that the path to decentralization is the right path?

[Pekhlivanov] It is simply inevitable. But we must take into account the difficulties and adapt to them. Work is under way at the KMTTO on these questions. We have a number of ideas and will implement those that not only have a future but also are in line with our real potentialities.

We welcome the idea—which is our idea, too—of an experiment in a unit of Maj. Toshev. But, before deciding to carry it out, we must weigh all the pros and cons and proceed like authentic professionals and economists. Moreover, we shall implement this policy in stages, in conformity with the actual course of the structural reforms in the economy and demonopolization.

Constitutional Court's Internal Procedures
92CH0152B Budapest REFORM in Hungarian
1 Nov 91 p 20

[Interview with Justice Geza Kilenyi of the Constitutional Court by Erzsebet J. Kun; place and date not given: "A Panel of Infallibles?"]

[Text] Without exaggeration, the Constitutional Court has become fashionable. More and more parties are requesting the court to deliver its decision in the course of administering justice. Not just citizens and various organizations, but even the president of the Republic himself. In the first year of the 10-member court's existence, 1,625 written motions have been filed with the court to institute proceedings for the interpretation of constitutionality, in conjunction with various issues. Our reporter interviewed Justice Geza Kilenyi of the Constitutional Court.

[Kun] How is the court able to handle this enormous work load?

[Kilenyi] A large proportion of the written motions fall outside the court's jurisdiction. To ease the justices' work load, moreover, the office of the court's secretary general screens the complaints. Naturally, every party is instructed where to turn with his or her complaint. Each written motion that passes screening is assigned by the chief justice to one of the court's 10 justices. In accordance with its importance, the justice in charge of a case determines whether to decide it himself or to refer it to a three-member bench or to the court's full session.

[Kun] On the basis of what criteria are the written motions classified?

[Kilenyi] There are cases of outstanding political significance that must be decided promptly. We had such a case, for example, when the president of the Republic requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of certain provisions in the compensation bill. Because the proceedings before our court suspended the legislative process, we had to decide that case promptly. In cases of outstanding importance, the justice in charge of the case personally drafts the court's decision, because every word matters. (Otherwise the decisions are drafted by the counselor who is on the court's staff. He, of course, receives instructions from the justice in charge of the case.)

In every case, all 10 justices receive advance copies of the drafted decision. This is important because the justices cannot afford to make mistakes, as there is no appeal from the Constitutional Court's decision, it being the court of first as well as last instance.

[Kun] In view of how immensely important the court's decisions are, have there been any attempts by political parties or private individuals to exert pressure on the court and influence its decisions?

[Kilenyi] It is unconstitutional to pressure any member of the Constitutional Court. In conjunction with the contents of a pending decision, therefore, it is not advisable to even attempt to influence the justice in charge of the case or a justice who will be voting on the decision in it. For

instance, nobody has attempted to approach me for that purpose since I have been on the Constitutional Court. But I do know of another case in which a party leader attempted to pressure one of my colleagues, before a decision in that case. The case in question was one of outstanding importance, and the justice informed the full session of the court about the attempt. There are, of course, also methods intended to exert pressure on the Constitutional Court as a whole. Such as, for instance, the statements that appeared during the wrangling over the Compensation Law, claiming that the National Assembly had done excellent work, and that anyone tampering with the text of the law would be causing the country harm. In conjunction with this I would like to point out that the Constitutional Court may examine a statutory regulation from only one point of view, namely its constitutionality. The decision's financial impact cannot come into consideration. Therefore the court may hand down also decisions that are painful for the state budget or the government. That is what happened also in the case of taxing mortgage interests.

[Kun] The Constitutional Court cannot err. How is an infallible decision reached?

[Kilenyi] Rarely is the court's standpoint unanimous. It has happened—on the issue of abortion, for instance—that we deliberated a case on as many as 10 separate occasions, for various reasons of principle, wording or even construction, because the final decision must not contain a single word that could be misconstrued. In cases before the full session of the court, the rule is that a vote must be taken if there is no consensus when the deliberations have ended. Generally that is typical of the Constitutional Court's decisions. If in the voting the justice in charge of the case has voted with the minority, usually he will voluntarily transfer the case to one of the justices who voted with the majority. But it follows from the principle of the judiciary's independence that he is not obliged to do so, and the case cannot be taken away from him. It is only natural, however, that a justice whose standpoint has been voted down cannot be forced to draft a new resolution, the content of which would be in conflict with his own conviction.

[Kun] Thanks to television, on several occasions we have been able to see the court delivering its decision in public. On such occasions the justices wear their respect-commanding robes.

[Kilenyi] Only in the most important cases does the court deliver its decision in public. On such occasions we do appear in our familiar judicial robes. Otherwise the Constitutional Court deliberates in closed session, where only the court's secretary general—he acts as court recorder—may be present, in addition to the 10 justices. At such times we do not wear our robes. But we put on our velvet robes when hearing arguments or taking testimony, to express also in this manner that the parties or witnesses are facing the judicial power of the Constitutional Court.

Ministers Disagree on Horthy Rehabilitation Plan92CH0142D Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP*

in Hungarian 29 Oct 91 p 3

[Article by Z.O.: "Horthy To Be Rehabilitated?"]

[Text] MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] representative Gyorgy Janosi wanted to hear Prime Minister Jozsef Antall's opinion on the government's intentions to politically rehabilitate and officially rebury Miklos Horthy von Nagybanya. According to information from the prime minister's office, Jozsef Antall's busy schedule makes it necessary to wait two weeks for an appointment, but the prime minister wishes to reply to the questions in person. Representative Gyorgy Janosi will say in his interpellation expected this afternoon that no one ever contested the Horthy family's right to rebury Miklos Horthy in Hungarian soil, but the idea of his political rehabilitation has never emerged. At this time Lajos Fur said that Horthy was a man of moderate abilities. The issue surfaced in Minister of Justice Istvan Balsai's 21 October statement in which he said that "Horthy's grave in Estoril, Portugal, probably does not suit Hungary's public opinion anymore." Janosi would like to know whether it is Balsai's or Fur's opinion that better reflects the government's view. If there is no official view on the matter, what is the prime minister's opinion on Horthy's political rehabilitation and official reburial? We will have to wait two weeks for the answer.

Retribution Law Sponsor's Own Past Questioned92CH0142C Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP*

in Hungarian 29 Oct 91 p 6

[Article by Denes Papp: "Peter Takacs Received a Vote of Confidence"]

[Text] The Zetenyi-Takacs bill on the modification of the Penal Code is again on the parliament's agenda. Nyiregyhaza historian and college professor Peter Takacs, coauthor of the draft proposing a retroactive cancellation of the lapse of individual acts of crime, has lately become a target of attacks because of—as he claims—arbitrarily selected reviews he wrote 10 years ago, e.g., "World history's most beautiful poem was being written in Soviet Russia on 7 November 1917." Peter Takacs' name also appears quite frequently nowadays in the columns of the county paper KELET-MAGYARORSZAG. In an interview, he rejected the accusations against him, but 21 Nyiregyhaza employees of the Geodeziai Vallalat [Geodesics Company] protested in letters to the editor against one of his earlier writings. For on 17 October parliamentary representative Takacs wrote an article of several columns' length under the title "Neo-Bolshevik Human Torture" on behalf of a company employee who confronted the management. But the letter to the editor, however, accused him of bias: "...it is an old and well-proven bolshevik method to interfere with and direct a company's internal affairs regulated by collective bargaining, with the knowledge of the government party's support."

Despite the upheavals, Peter Takacs was the one who gave a speech at the tomb of Budapest's revolutionary martyrs on 23 October, and at the subsequent county ceremony

organized by the TIB [Historical Justice Committee] and the POFOSZ [National Organization of Political Prisoners]. Jozsef Gulyas, parliamentary representative from Nyiregyhaza and secretary of the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] faction, left the ceremony, thus expressing his opinion—as he later stated to our correspondent—that the speaker was unworthy of the victims of '56 and of those commemorating the event. In his ceremonial speech, Peter Takacs expounded, among other things, on the cruelty of the 20th century for decimating the Magyars twice in each generation. All negative feelings may lead to chaos even today, he stated, and to this tormented people's inability to build the Hungary of its dreams.

At any rate, Peter Takacs suffered a great loss of prestige by the upheaval his warmed-up, 10-year-old writing elicited (the newspapers that have been quoting from his reviews have been extremely popular in the reading room of the teacher's college—the students snapped them from each other's hands); this is why, as chairman of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] county committee, he asked for a vote of confidence from the county committee. In its statement, the latter said that—quoting from KELET-MAGYARORSZAG—"even if one's convictions do not change, his opinion may change in evaluating things." Of the 19 voters, three abstained, but the other 16 stood fast behind their chairman and, thus, Peter Takacs continues to enjoy their confidence.

Prosecution of Old Crimes Called Problematic92CH0142E Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP*

in Hungarian 6 Nov 91 p 3

[Article by K.L.: "Rules on Legal Procedures of Justice Are Missing"]

[Text] On Monday, the parliament passed the much-debated law on the possibility of prosecuting crimes not prosecuted politically during earlier decades. A Ministry of Interior official said in this connection that, beyond political considerations, the statute's implementation raises a number of practical problems. One of the most pressing questions is, how one can adhere to the general principle of law that says that every perpetrator of crimes, without exception, must be called to account. For numerous violations of the law have not yet been discovered and, because of the limited capacity of judiciary apparatus, probably not all acts of crime can be dealt with. How will, then, those cases be selected in which prosecution will be initiated? It is possible that in a few dozen cases the initiation of prosecution will be motivated by vengeance.

During the parliamentary debate, several persons called for wise self-restraint—which is a category that is difficult to interpret from the aspect of procedural law. Evidence is more tangible than that; however, the latter is also made questionable by the long time that has elapsed since the acts of crime. Investigations that have already been underway in a few major cases that have brought meager results also shed some light on the difficulties in fact-finding.

At the present time, an official of the Chief Prosecutor's Office was only able to interpret the law on the basis of procedural laws and regulations of authority that are in effect. Accordingly, the National Police Headquarters has the exclusive authority to initiate a legal process for treason; it is the task of the Budapest Chief Prosecutor's Office to file an indictment, and the trial in the first instance must be held at the Budapest Municipal Court. Homicide cases will be handled by the county police, county prosecutors, and county courts.

Such cases involve major acts of crime to be prosecuted—if the authorities find out about them. Thus, if something is reported and the data reveal a basis for suspicion, an investigation must be ordered. This is a purely technical question, just like the presentation of evidence and the prosecutor's legal supervision. It is to be feared, however, that the law will elicit a reporting campaign—there are already some indications for this; but decency is a category that is outside the law.

The prosecutor said that investigating homicide, i.e., physical injury resulting in death, is a routine task from a professional aspect and that a lack of evidence is perhaps the only possible problem. But no one has been prosecuted for the crime of treason during the last decade and, consequently, there is not a single expert who has expertise in this area. In addition, it is a rather unfortunate solution to initiate a legal process in 1991, based on the 1974 Penal Code, for cases that happened in the 1950's and that at present are considered acts of treason.

One must not forget either that parliament—in just a few minutes' time—passed another law as well on Monday, namely, the modification of the appointment of prosecution officials on the basis of open competition. This applies to more than 200 members of the prosecution staff of about a thousand persons; the next few months will be rather uncertain for them. And, the organization must be kept running somehow even during the competition fever.

Historical Justice Committee Compiles Accusations

92CH0142F Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP*
in Hungarian 7 Nov 91 p 5

[MTI report: "Will There Be Any Denouncements?"]

[Text] Organizations rallying the participants of the 1956 revolution are happy to see the new law of lapse, but they do not agree on the issue of whether the opportunity offered by the new law is being taken by organizations as well and whether lists of persons to be prosecuted are being made. Janos Roik, executive chairman of the '56 Alliance, said that they will probably ask their local organizations in a memorandum that they search out those persons who committed crimes covered by the new law. After the compilation of the list, the Alliance wants to verify the accusations through witnesses in order to avoid accusing innocent persons. It is expected that those who will be convicted of being murderers, traitors, or for torturing innocent people to death will receive appropriate punishments. Janos Roik also stated that they do not know the exact wording of the law

but if it only applies to the chief culprits, then there will be no more than 100-150 sentences.

POFOSZ [National Organization of Political Prisoners] attorney Ervin Szeredi, too, can hardly wait for the *MAGYAR KOZLONY*'s new issue. Nevertheless, he noted that the organization considers it important to put the culprits in prison, to confiscate their property, and to suspend their political rights. At this time he could not answer the question of whether charges against culprits will be filed by individuals or by organizations.

Historical Justice Committee [TIB] spokesman Andras Firon reminded us that, already in September, the TIB issued a statement of principle regarding the personal issues of administering justice. Firon said that the TIB thought that two laws were necessary in addition to the existing ones, namely, one dealing with the victims of the past dictatorship, and one dealing with those who committed acts of crime against life and/or people. The TIB conducted talks with MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party], FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party], and KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] representatives who did not object to these fundamental principles of administering justice. The TIB agrees that the Zetenyi bill does not contradict these principles either, but it does not consider itself qualified to prepare a list of culprits.

Churches Reclaiming Over 6,000 Buildings

92CH0142B Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP*
in Hungarian 6 Nov 91 p 4

[Article by Z.O.: "Churches Are Reclaiming Over 6,000 Real Estate Properties"]

[Text] The law that regulates the ownership of real estate formerly owned by churches was passed by parliament at its 10 June session. The law pertains to all churches, denominations, religious communities, and other church organizations that were registered before 1 January 1948 and that had developed real estate properties that were taken away without compensation by the state after the date mentioned. Claims for regaining these properties could be filed at the office of the Ministry of Culture and Education within 90 days after the law went into effect. Laszlo Szalay, deputy chief of the Main Department of Church Relations of the Ministry of Culture and Education, said that they received more than 6,000 claims for real estate properties from 13 churches by the 1 November deadline. These claims will be filed and, according to plans, will be processed electronically. The ministry has 60 days to notify the land offices so that they can issue restraints of alienation for properties under claim, and it will also notify the present legal occupants and former owners.

It is apparent from the material received that most properties are being reclaimed by the Roman Catholic Church, possibly in part because of the appearance of a large number of reviving monastic orders and because this church had the most properties. The Catholic Church filed

almost 3,000 claims, and the Calvinist Reformed Church filed almost 2,500 claims. The remaining—hardly more than 500—claims were filed by 11 smaller churches, said Laszlo Szalay to our correspondent.

Among the reclaimed buildings is the Reformed Church's former high school building on Lonyay Street, which is now being used by the Budapest University of Economics as a classroom building. Dr. Jozsef Kupcsik, professor and prorector, said that returning the building had already come up during talks between university officials and alumni one-and-a-half years ago. The university spent 1.5 billion [forints] for reconstruction, several hundred million just for the reconstruction and renovation of the classroom building according to its needs, including the building for the new library. In addition to housing the country's largest computer center, this building also has classrooms, department offices, and a gymnasium that is used jointly with Budapest Technical University.

The rector announced at an earlier university council meeting that the university is willing to talk about the Lonyay Street building only if it will be compensated with another building of identical value. So much the more as it already is in need of more classrooms and has already filed a request for an additional building. Prorector Kupcsik said that moving to the new center alone cost 8-9 million. If they had to return the building, that would practically halt university operations as they have no funds at present for another move. Common sense also dictates that the building should continue to be a university building, for remodeling it again as a high school would cost millions.

Libyan Oil Enterprise Considers Investment

*92CH0175H Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 21 Oct 91 p 8*

[Article by H.Z.M.: "Libyan Capital To Join Oil Competition in Hungary"]

[Text] The recently formed Libyan-Hungarian joint enterprise Tamoil Hungaria limited-liability corporation plans to appear with four or five gas pumps in the market this year, and in the long term is intends to operate about 100 filling stations throughout Hungary. Seventy-five percent of the new joint enterprise's 100-million-forint capital has been contributed by the Libyan National Oil Enterprise registered in the Netherlands, the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Enterprise, and Oil Invest Holding, a company established by the Libyan Arab External Economy Bank. Mineralimpex and its Vienna-based subsidiary Mineralkontor will each contribute 12.5 percent of the capital. Oil Invest, which has a 15-million-ton refining capacity (about 1.5 times the volume of Hungarian refining capacities) has been operating refineries in five European countries thus far, and with its 2,000 filling stations it controls 5 percent of the market in Italy and 8 percent (350 pumps) in Switzerland. Their plans call for acquiring about 10 percent of the Hungarian market, which holds out the promise of keen competition, because every company that has entered the Hungarian market thus far endeavors to acquire a 10-percent control. Including Tamoil, nine firms are active in gasoline sales in Hungary (Afor, Agip, Aral, BP, Esso, Shell,

Total, and Q8), but due to traditional business relations, the market shares of Shell and of the Hungarian company well exceed 10 percent. Oil Invest disposes of over 300,000 barrels of high-white-material-content Libyan oil per day.

MAGYAR HIRLAP understands that this is the first time for Libyan capital to appear in Hungary. The firm also wants to supply crude oil and products to Hungary.

Chinese Protest Restrictions, Mistreatment

*92CH0117B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 25 Oct 91 p 4*

[Article by L.K.: "Tribulations of the Chinese in Hungary; They Would Open Banks, Are Looking for Investment Opportunities"]

[Text] The government is preparing to restrict or limit Chinese immigration in ways that have not yet been worked out, announced foreign policy spokesman Janos Herman last week. Following are the views of Chinese who reside in Hungary.

According to estimates, there are now about 10,000 Chinese living in Hungary, according to associates of the Hungarian Chinese Center. As they stated, most Chinese bring sizeable amounts of capital to this country, thus offering job opportunities to many Hungarians. Thus, their stay in this country is mutually advantageous, yet they feel that the authorities have certain suspicions about them. One demonstration of this is that even at the borders they are the targets of special attention, and it is very difficult for them to obtain permits to settle here.

According to representatives of the Chinese community, most of them come from the People's Republic, but there have been arrivals from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and even the United States and Australia. Following the systemic transformation, businessmen see excellent investment opportunities here, and they have already invested significant amounts. A Budapest bank, for example, handles the money of 1,200 Chinese, and several of these accounts show a balance of several million dollars. There are more than 1,000 firms of Chinese ownership in the country; most of these are in the fields of tourism, but there is already a series of physicians and merchants who work here, and bankers also expressed their desire to open financial institutions in Hungary. At the moment, there are negotiations underway concerning about 150 new business locations, most of which are the objects of interest by new firms.

Our country is attractive to the Chinese in spite of the fact that, due to different traditions and customs, as well as the different societal system, they must face some difficulties. An even greater problem for them is that they find our financial regulations, especially those concerning customs duties, difficult to comprehend. There have been a number of instances when customs officers subjected Chinese departing from this country to humiliating harassment, even confiscating their hard currency, even though they were not asked what they brought with them when they arrived here. Moreover, it has also been alleged that at

Zahony a young girl was molested, and requested to provide certain services in exchange for an entry permit.

It is relatively easy to obtain a permit to stay for the first time; however, there are problems when it is time to extend the permit. Even owners of successfully operating firms have been denied validation of their permits; as a result, several of them do not even apply for extension, but instead face the risks involved. In recent weeks, there were problems even with working permits. The cook and the interpreter of a Chinese restaurant were denied work permits in order to protect the labor market in the capital, even though the enterprise employs Hungarians in areas where special skills are not required.

The Chinese have also told us that even in the most outrageous cases they avoided filing official complaints, because they wish to avoid conflict at all costs. Still, they have no desire to remain silent any longer. After all, they consider it unacceptable that foreign holders of capital who wish to invest in this country are scared away with methods of this kind.

Kupa on Csurka, Expo, Fellow Ministers

*92CH0117C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 25 Oct 91 pp 1, 9*

[Unattributed report on interview with Minister of Finance Mihaly Kupa by unidentified reporters in Budapest on 24 October: "Kupa: If Akos Bod Peter Can Do It...."]

[Text] Hungary's minister of finance ended his nearly two-week-long absence yesterday, after following up the meetings of the IMF and the World Bank, by conducting bilateral talks not only in Thailand but also in Malaysia and Singapore. In the aftermath of a roughly 24-hour-long flight, the minister of finance asked reporters to state their questions loudly, since his ears were still plugged up.

MAGYAR HIRLAP's questions covered the following topics: Is not the minister of finance troubled by the fact that he was absent for nearly two weeks, in view of the fact that he would have to depart for Los Angeles this Friday; and in the meantime the National Assembly discussed and ratified the law concerning the central bank and began to perform a detailed analysis of the budgetary guidelines? How does he react to Istvan Csurka's weekly repeated attacks on the financial aspect of the administration's work? What is his opinion concerning new developments related to the world exposition planned for 1996, which he called unrealizable? How does he feel about the most recent public opinion survey published by NEPSZABAD-SAG, which claims that, even though he is still the cabinet's most popular member, the minister for economic relations abroad is beginning to catch up with him?

The minister of finance considered it quite correct that the budget debate got under way in his absence. As for the world exposition, he stated that, as far as he could recall, he was the first to recommend a plebiscite on the issue as far back as May. Furthermore, if the Minister of Industry Akos Bod Peter can speak out against the world exposition, then the issue is not likely to fail solely on account of

objections raised by the minister of finance. In commenting on Bela Kadar's growing popularity, Mihaly Kupa thought it was conceivable, but characterized the world exposition's preparation as frighteningly weak and lacking any opportunity to come to a decision. Mihaly Kupa cited Laszlo Bekesi and Attila Soos Karoly, who spoke of "a budget of squalor" in their recent statements, which makes it impossible to stage a world exposition.

The minister of finance restated that he is not interested in popularity: He said that he would get along without a portfolio; as a matter of fact, he would be financially better off if he were not a minister.

The minister of finance has not read Istvan Csurka's recent notes (the gist of which is that although Kupa became a deputy with MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] support, on the issue of the world exposition he became "spokesman of the [Budapest] City Council, which is dominated by the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] and the FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats]—Ed.), and thus was unwilling to respond to the remarks that he [Kupa] labeled as "tranquil neighing."

In the ensuing discussion, Kupa described the staff at the Ministry of Finance as excellent, and stated that after the parliamentary parties clean up around themselves they can report to him to find out how many communists are employed at the Ministry. He expressed indignation over being invited by Etele Barath as a consultant, adding his opinion that the commissioner in charge of preparations for the world exposition should have resigned long ago, instead of "playing around with the idea of a world exposition for two years."

In response to inferences that he has been traveling too much, Mihaly Kupa said that in response to American politicians, for example, he makes too few trips abroad; but perhaps as a private citizen he will try to make up for this.

Kupa stated that the IMF and the World Bank have high regard for Hungary's economic policies. In the three Southeast Asian countries mentioned above, the Hungarian cabinet member met with financial experts. Heading off questions about the central bank, he recited an "entertaining episode": Wednesday he met Singapore's minister of finance, who is also the president of the central bank, and furthermore directs the supervision of his nation's banking. So there are models like that, too....

Notwithstanding the above, the minister of finance said that he is very happy with the law on the central bank that was ratified by the National Assembly. Talking about his talks in the Far East, he observed that from our European vantage point we consider that region to be in the developing stage; still, it is especially Hungary that must strive not to fall below the level of development that has been achieved by the countries of the Far East. As examples, he mentioned the infrastructure in Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, along with the developments implemented in recent years in their telecommunication systems. One can do business with those countries, one can attract their investors to come to Hungary, and we must make a

suitable propaganda effort to convince them that we are a literate country. Following this, the minister criticized the propaganda activities undertaken by the Ministry for Economic Relations Abroad.

It was also announced that Hungary just signed a treaty concerning the protection of investments with Thailand, and similar negotiations are underway with Malaysia and Singapore.

Talking about the national debt, the minister of finance said that in order to protect its good standing the country must have another very good economic year, after which the economy will be manageable with no further difficulties. As for the budget, he stated that, contrary to statements made by opposition deputies, the present budget is not one of squalor, but one that tries to adopt to altered circumstances. While hurrying from the airport to the meeting of the Cabinet, Mihaly Kupa described the debate concerning personal income taxes as complicated, admitting that the present taxation system is socially unjust and that the various exemptions and allowances must be moderated in such a way as to reduce the taxation level on the whole. It would be fatal for the budget if the outcome of consultations and legislative debates was a tax increase.

In discussions with international financial institutions, objections were raised on account of no real progress in the area of social security, nor were the negotiating partners convinced that budgetary deficit could be kept under 60-80 billion forints. Instead, the minister considers a 90-95 billion forint deficit more realistic, adding that it should not exceed this, because a 100 billion forint figure would imply the reaching of a serious psychological demarcation point.

In answer to questions concerning the convertibility of the forint, the minister said that the country needs a convertibility that does not infringe on the considerations of equilibrium, adding that the residents "already have convertibility when it comes to their purchasing habits."

When the representative of MAGYAR HIRLAP asked whether Mihaly Kupa has enough strength and prestige to have the government accept his proposals, the minister answered by saying that he is not without opportunities, he could find another job, he does not consider himself exposed to low and witless attacks, and he cares very little about the position or about owning a Volkswagen Passat. In his most recent trips abroad, he had been told that Hungary can maintain an advantage over the other East European countries for the next two years. He considers it regrettable that in this regard Poland and Czechoslovakia argue with Hungary, even before international publicity; in order to clear this up, he invited Klaus Czechoslovak, finance minister to Budapest.

Initial Self-Privatization Agreements Listed

92CH0175G Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 21 Oct 91 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Self-Privatization Model Has Started on Its Path: 34 Agreements"]

[Text] The start of self-privatization may significantly accelerate the privatization process. Not too long ago the AVU [State Property Agency] published a list of firms—also reported in MAGYAR HIRLAP—which may serve as advisers in this process. This is a listing of 34 cases in which companies to be privatized have found privatizers.

	Enterprise To Be Privatized	Privatization Adviser
1.	Trabant Ferencvaros Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
2.	Kelenfold FIAT Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
3.	Kalocsa Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
4.	Kaposvill Electrical Machine Repair and Service Enterprise	Dunaholding, Inc.
5.	Hodmezovasarhely Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
6.	Bekescsaba Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
7.	Capital City Real Estate Brokerage Enterprise	Bross Holding, Inc.
8.	Elko Electrical Maintenance Enterprise	Dunaholding, Inc.
9.	Paszomany Drapery and Lace Makers	Kossuth Holding, Inc.
10.	Szenzor Management Enterprise	Deak and Deak Ltd.
11.	Renault Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
12.	Commercial Investment Enterprise (KERBER)	Ferbal Partnership
13.	Tiszaok State Farm	Bross Holding Inc.
14.	Alfa Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
15.	Kobanya Wood Works Enterprise	Kockazat, Inc.
16.	Pecs Furniture Factory	Kecskemet Holding, Inc.
17.	Geological Research and Mining Implements Manufacturing Enterprise	Kecskemet Holding, Inc.
18.	Communication Technology and Household Machine Repair Small Enterprise, Szigetvar	Dunaholding, Inc.
19.	Communication Technology and Household Machine Repair Small Enterprise	Dunaholding, Inc.
20.	Capital City Construction and Technical Enterprise	Consorg
21.	East Hungary Wood Works Enterprise, Nyiregyhaza	ETD, Ltd.
22.	Siovill Electrical Repair and Service Enterprise	Polibasic, Ltd.
23.	Foundry Molding and Auxiliary Materials Manufacturing Enterprise	Budapest Investment
24.	National Market Research Institute	IFB Bank, Inc.
25.	Kiskunhalas Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
26.	Gyula Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.

	Enterprise To Be Privatized	Privatization Adviser
27.	Rakoskeresztur Car Repair Enterprise	VOFA, Ltd.
28.	Bagod Agricultural Machine Manufacturing Enterprise	Co-Nexus, Inc.
29.	Construction Affairs Information center	Macon, Inc.
30.	Kermix Hospitality Industry Machine Manufacturing State Enterprise	Macon, Inc.
31.	Szinkron Car Service State Enterprise	Macon, Inc.
32.	Tatabanya Spring Factory	Dunaholding, Inc.
33.	Belvaros Electrical Machinery and Equipment Repair Enterprise	Dunaholding, Inc.
34.	Debrecen Brush Factory	Kockazat, Inc.

Wage Liberalization Expected Next Year

92CH0117A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 25 Oct 91 p 4

[Article by Edit Osz: "Wage Regulations Will Be Suspended Next Year"]

[Text] According to all indications, in 1992 we will be able to talk about wage liberalization, even though, for the time being, this will only amount to regulating our liberties. After all, it is inconceivable that wages should grow out of proportion to performance and without regard to justification. At yesterday's plenary meeting of the Arbitration Council, the discussion involved the means for establishing a collective method for wage negotiations and the consequence of liberties in the aftermath of eliminating wage regulations. As the spokesperson of employers said in the course of the discussion, "we have found ourselves skating on ice, without knowing either its thickness or the

depth of the water beneath." The prevailing worry is that a complete elimination of regulations would still not bring results; as a consequence, for the time being all three sides proposed nothing more than a break in applying the tax clauses of wage regulations, promising that the wage agreement reached before the Arbitration Council will be reviewed later this year on the basis of experience.

In order to measure average wages in the future, we need to develop a unified method of calculation, and to determine the allowable upper and lower limits of wage increases. In making these calculations, our guide will not be the consumer price index, but rather the given level at which it is possible to maintain livelihood. Wage liberalization could be implemented between these parameters; however, as soon as any management unit were to deviate from this guide by more than three to five percentage points, the Arbitration Council would have to initiate discussions of measures aimed at moderating unfavorable developments. The government is not genuinely inclined to see the same guiding principles governing the budgetary sphere, too. In these regions, wage policies will be guided by the law on the working conditions of civil servants, which will be ratified in the near future.

The participants had lengthy discussions concerning the establishment of forums which would accommodate wage negotiations. The Arbitration Council concurs with the use of the trilevel system in the competitive sphere; it is a basic condition of effective operation, however, that at the middle level (that is, at the branch, professional, and regional organizations) institutions suitable for such talks be developed as soon as possible. In connections with this, the government feels it is important for midlevel agreements to reflect as much of the workers' will as possible. In the final analysis, yesterday's meeting of the Arbitration Council sufficed only to clarify aspirations and intentions; the work will be continued in specialized committees.

UD Seeks Pragmatic Economic Policy

92EP0099A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 45,
11 Nov 91 pp 16-18

[Interview with Piotr Nowina-Konopka, secretary general of the Democratic Union, by Marek Krol and Piotr Gabryel; place and date not given: "A Union of Pragmatists—Neither Margaret Thatcher nor Olof Palme Alone Will Do: We Need Both Sensibilities"]

[Text] [WPROST] President Walesa has proposed four ways of overcoming the problems in forming a ruling coalition. Are they all acceptable to the Union?

[Nowina-Konopka] The times are such that no alternative may be rejected in advance.

[WPROST] In view of this, would you be ready to enter into a coalition with the post-Communist groupings?

[Nowina-Konopka] Previously, when considering the potential situation in the event that it would fall to our lot to form the cabinet, we had not anticipated such a possibility, and we stressed that we would seek for a majority outside the post-Communist parties. If, however, Lech Walesa were to form the government and we were to be only one of the parties invited to participate in it, then someone else would be the framer of the coalition.

[WPROST] We have the impression that, except for the Democratic Union and the Liberal-Democratic Congress—the parties which have tasted the "honey" of governing—the other groupings are not very much aware of the disastrous condition of our state.

[Nowina-Konopka] This exactly is also my feeling. But I hope in addition that debates during the preelection campaign are one thing and a realistic program of responsibility is another. On this hope I am building my idea of the sole possible chance for forming some responsible government based on political parties.

[WPROST] The government to be formed has no prospects for scoring any major successes in the short run. Do not you fear that if the Democratic Union enters such a government and thus abandons some of its own program planks, it may be a big loser. Bigger than if it stays in the opposition?

[Nowina-Konopka] The UD [Democratic Union] will not enter any coalition that would not be promoting national interests. These are the limits of compromise. Of course, we realize that such a government will not be a government of spectacular successes and one strengthening the parties which form it or which will support it. We are used to it and prepared for it.

[WPROST] After meeting with the president, Tadeusz Mazowiecki left directly for home without stopping by at the UD's main office. Does this mean that Lech Walesa views not him but Jacek Kuron, with whom he had met earlier, as the UD's leader?

[Nowina-Konopka] That is a totally groundless interpretation! As known, the person authorized by the UD's presidium to conduct talks on the party's behalf is its

chairman, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and that is why, following preliminary talks with Jacek Kuron, the president had invited Tadeusz Mazowiecki to come. The president presented to him his proposals and we shall consider them upon consulting representatives of other parties.

[WPROST] The UD also has declared itself in favor of amending the Balcerowicz Program. What specifically would be amended?

[Nowina-Konopka] For a long time now we have been repeating that as regards monetary matters we shall try to continue the economic policy popularly known as the Balcerowicz program. As for its revisions, these should concern the negative consequences ensuing precisely from the restrictive monetary policy. These consequences cannot be entirely eliminated, but their extent and scope can be curtailed. This concerns, e.g., the philosophy of approach to the state sector. The former Polish People's Republic was fascinated by this sector, but subsequently in the last two years, a similar attitude of piety existed toward the private sector. It is time to balance the boat. In the capitalist countries private companies coexist with state ones and compete with them on the market; it should not be any different in this country. In this connection, it is clearly necessary to initiate a process whereby promising state enterprises should be supported and the bankruptcy of unpromising ones promoted, though not by some administrative fiat but according to market indications.

[WPROST] Are you not being too optimistic? Essentially, so far most enterprises have been focusing on just one thing: how to survive Balcerowicz.

[Nowina-Konopka] That is because financial policy has not been differentiated between good and bad companies and thus the direction of the desired changes was not promoted. I am obviously not referring here to any fine-tuning from the top but to the establishment of a clear mechanism assuring that a good economic performance would entitle enterprises to such benefits as, e.g., exemption from the ruinous burden of wage controls or payment of the so-called dividend to the state.

[WPROST] But while the UD is in favor of an amended Balcerowicz Program, how does it feel about Balcerowicz himself? Does it want to keep him?

[Nowina-Konopka] Leszek Balcerowicz has contributed a great deal to Polish reforms. Without his pertinacity in the fight against inflation, we would have been in a worse condition during the present period of transformation. That is for one thing. For another, however, I do not think that Leszek Balcerowicz is the only Balcerowicz in Poland. I do not agree either with the opinion that Deputy Premier Balcerowicz is—from the standpoint of the West—an "iron-clad guarantee" that Poland shall adhere to the proper policy on changes.

Of course, I would have nothing against Balcerowicz's continuing to be responsible for Polish finances—in one way or another. But I wish to point out that the Mazowiecki Administration included at least several other outstanding personalities in addition to Balcerowicz. There

were, for example, Jacek Kuron or Waldemar Kuczynski. In contrast, the current Bielecki administration is almost entirely dominated by Balcerowicz—not that, of course, that is his fault.

We designed the Democratic Union and its program in the image of the Mazowiecki administration, stressing an equilibrium between a firmly liberal approach and an approach which malicious critics term Left-oriented but which I myself term an approach enriched by some social sensitivity. It was only through discussion between representatives of these two approaches that we were able to formulate a realistic—and therefore acceptable to the public—program for restructuring Poland. That also should be the road to forming a new government. Poland needs a firm liberal policy, in order to attain a free-market economy. But at the same time, the same Poland is a country of destitute people and empty government coffers, and hence it needs to be socially sensitive. For us neither Margaret Thatcher alone nor Olof Palme alone would be enough. We need both sensibilities at the same time.

[WPROST] You are thus proposing a “third road,” are you not ?

[Nowina-Konopka] Not at all. I am proposing an “aideo-logical” approach to thinking about the economy. I am proposing pragmatism. And that precisely requires flexibility.

Prospects of Fragmented Sejm Considered

92EP0097A *Poznan WPROST in Polish No 44,*
3 Nov 91 pp 20-22

[Article by Dawid Warszawski: “An X-Encore Term? Will It Be Tyminski All Over Again?”]

[Text] The 11th Sejm will commence its activities with a feeling of comfort, knowing that it has a four-year term ahead of it. That feeling may prove mistaken.

* * *

In countries with a stable democracy, parliamentary elections very rarely signal a radical upheaval. Even if they result in a change in the ruling team, this does not affect radically the life of the average citizen. The basic institutional, political, and economic issues in such countries have already been resolved earlier. It is precisely to this relative stabilization, besides, that the disturbing indicators of low voter turnout observed in many democratic countries are ascribed: The citizens do not vote because they do not believe that their ballots will change much.

It could thus be said that, seen from this standpoint, Poland is already a country of stable democracy. Most likely, a majority of voters will not participate in the first fully democratic elections after 75 years, and they will not change the country radically. But the difference consists in that many fundamental institutional issues have not been resolved in Poland, unlike in the countries of stable democracy, and the trouble is that the elections will not change that.

Tons of paper have already been inscribed with lamentations about the fragmentation of Polish political life.

The Political Parties Are Proliferating...

...and the proportional-vote electoral law promotes their splintering. They rarely offer genuinely competing programs; if they differ from each other, it is chiefly ideologically, although both their authors and voters are aware that the chances for a postelection alignment of forces that would serve to translate ideological assumptions into reality are zero.

The principal economic disputes center about the further strategy of the reforms, but here too the differences in views are more seeming than real; the main post-Solidarity political forces are generally in accord about the need to abandon Balcerowicz's absolute monetarism, but at the same time they admit that jettisoning it too radically threatens an economic disaster. Therefore they hide behind a verbal smoke-screen, arguing that “the second step” should be made and “the rigors relaxed.” No serious person dots the “i,” because no one knows where to find that “i.” At most, they issue declarations of intent as to leaving Balcerowicz himself in his current post; that is a bit too little for a program of action.

The situation is similar with regard to the principal institutional problems: The scope of theoretically available options has shrunk under the pressure of the reality. The camp of the supporters of presidential-parliamentary republic [with balanced executive and legislative powers] has unexpectedly grown, with the Democratic Union having joined it recently. This is due to both the consolidation of Lech Walesa's standing in Polish political life and, partly, to the fear that the postelection parliament, although freely and doubtless democratically elected, will be even less effective in governing the state than the present parliament.

The issues on which the main political parties genuinely differ thus remain indeed few: Position on de-Communization, on abortion, and on the role of the Catholic Church in public life. Were the risk to exist that the elections might result in some radical decisions, it could be expected that voter turnout would be high, for such a prospect would encourage voters to show up at the polling station in order to bring about or prevent such solutions. But that will not happen, and the proportional character of the electoral law is an effective barrier to it. And thus, with respect to these issues too, not much will change as a result of the elections.

The electoral frauds committed by [Tyminski's] Party X has eliminated the sole possibility of the rise of a radical alternative such as would be represented by electing a Sejm where a majority of the deputies would be from non-Solidarity forces and, as a consequence, form the government. An SDRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], PSL-SP coalition [Social Democrats of the Republic of Poland (post-Communists)], Party X, Polish Peasant Party, Peasant Accord], given the support of smaller non-Solidarity parties, may seem inconceivable only at present. But Sejm arithmetics would make this

possibility a realistic one, and thereby it would endanger the accomplishments of the last two years. The fiasco of Tyminski's party has eliminated this danger, and this radical alternative.

What Then Would the New Sejm Be Like?

First, the Chamber will have to form a government on the basis of the existing constitutional provisions and, most likely, with the aid of the same forces at present. The coalition of the Democratic Union (UD) with Prime Minister Bielecki's Liberal-Democratic Congress seems certain, but the formula will have to be broadened leftward or rightward. The former seems hardly likely in view of the political orientation of the coalition and in view of the numerical strength of the representation of the Solidarity Left. Thus there will remain only the coalition with the Center Accord, despite the drastic preelection denials of that party's leaders.

Such a government could give the voters only one surprise: the name of the new prime minister and a couple of ministers. His political and economic line would have to be, in the nature of things, at least on basic issues, a continuation of the policy of the two previous administrations.

It can also be expected that the post-Communists and the peasant parties will not enter the government and will sharply criticize it from the outset. Here too we shall be dealing with a continuation of the old parliamentary situation, although this time the forces of the government coalition will be more numerous than those of the opposition. Furthermore, the absence of prospects for the inclusion in the government of the forces elected chiefly owing to their radical, claimant social programs may result in their further splintering. It is likely that some splinter peasant parties will go over to the government camp while the remainder will adopt an increasingly more populist hue, thus gaining credibility among voters but forfeiting the chance to offer an alternative to the government. This too is a situation familiar to us from the former parliament.

Likewise, the problems to be faced by the new Sejm will, after the initial period of disorder and maturation of new deputies, resemble uncannily the problems with which the old Sejm has been struggling toward the end of its term. The issue of escaping from the trap of high retirement pensions and guaranteed farm prices will become urgent. The decisions taken on these matters by the incumbent deputies displayed all the characteristics of bribery of the numerically strong constituencies; the parliamentarians who benefited from these decisions will now face the thankless but just task of having to backtrack from the facile promises they had made. Draft de-Communizing and antiabortion legislation will once again be considered upon being proposed by freshly baked militant new deputies, and once again it will be tabled, as expected by old parliamentary foxes, in commission which will work out yet another compromise that will satisfy no one but will be the sole acceptable one.

Well then, will that be merely "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*" [the more things change, the more they stay the same]? Not necessarily. The 11th Sejm will differ from its predecessor in many respects which may in the long run, or perhaps even sooner, alter these expectations.

Thus, first of all, it will start from the same, that is, low, level of social acceptance as the 10th Sejm. What it will gain from the democratic character of the elections it will lose in the eyes of public opinion owing to the probable low voter turnout in these elections. But unlike the previous Sejm, it will derive comfort from the feeling that it has ahead of it four years of work. That feeling may prove mistaken, but still it will make the deputies feel that they do not have to work under constant fire from hostile public opinion and mass media. This may prompt the deputies to be more bold as lawmakers, to take decisions that are sure to be unpopular but needed.

Second, being freed from its "contract" odium [being elected freely rather than under the 1989 "roundtable" agreement apportioning most seats to Communist deputies] the Sejm will find it easier to criticize the government and perhaps also the president. At the same time it will face the need to vote a new constitution. This will cause the Sejm—unless it compromises itself in its first few months by inability to form a government coalition—to gain a stronger standing among the most important state bodies than that of the 10th Sejm. We shall certainly witness sharp conflicts between the 11th Sejm and other branches of power, with the consequences of these conflicts determining, at first as precedents and later constitutionally, the institutional foundations of the division of powers in the Third Republic.

Third and last, this Sejm will be a perhaps incomplete but genuine representation of social interests. The peasant parties, the worker Left, and the Liberals—all these parties will represent the interests of their own particular constituencies rather than some abstract "society as such." One certain result is that the parties in the Sejm will conclude social compromises that would be realistic and force groupings with a more differentiated electorate to define more explicitly which interests they desire to represent. This will promote the evolution of a new simpler and clearer image of the Polish political scene. With a modicum of luck, the coming elections will have the character of a genuine competition among interests. And then even the voters may come to the polls.

Municipal Governments Aid in Privatization

92EP0061C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) 25 Oct 91 p 1

[Article by Ewa Zychowicz: "Privatization in Gminas"]

[Text] Local governments took over more than 900 public utilities enterprises, for which chiefs of municipalities and gminas acted as founding fathers, and also about 50 smaller enterprises, such as state machine stations, food processing plants, veterinary clinics and others. Commercial enterprises functioning within gminas can be easily privatized. Public utilities require a special approach

because they have limited financial independence and service big urban agglomerations, as for instance transport services, water and sewage, electric and heating companies, and sewage treatment plants.

The property of such enterprises is subject to compulsory communalization, but because it is often shared by several gminas, the transfer of ownership is difficult and takes long. Special legal regulations would be necessary to simplify the process of dividing these enterprises and transferring their ownership to gminas. What cannot be avoided is the tedious inventory taking and the many complicated legal actions connected with this.

According to the law of territorial self-government, by 31 December 1991, each gmina will have to determine the legal and organizational format for economic activities in enterprises of its ownership. Until now, 240 public utilities enterprises have been transformed into plants or budget units, 45 into partnership companies, 50 have been liquidated and 95 remain, for the time being, in their previous form. Sixty-five commercial enterprises have been transformed into companies in which the gmina has a 100 percent share, eight into budget plants, and 42 have been liquidated. Among small enterprises taken over by gminas, 10 have been transformed into sales companies, five have been privatized by leasing or selling part of their property. Thirty-five enterprises have kept their previous form.

The bill prepared by the Ministry of Ownership Transformation and the Territorial Self-Government Bureau includes the possibility of utilities transformation into partnership companies by gminas with the compulsory transfer of stock to others waived for two years. A variety of privatization methods will also be possible. The proposal includes a provision that economic entities offering public services to a gmina will be exempted from the tax on the growth of remuneration.

From the experience of the Ministry of Ownership Transformation, it appears that employees of many enterprises undergoing privatization keep protesting against the transformation, motivated by their fear of losing jobs in the newly formed economic entities. Another issue that raises doubts is the transfer of ownership of apartment buildings that belonged to those enterprises. Many questions are also raised regarding the creation of single partnership gmina companies, the determination of payments for use of gmina property, and the evaluation of the property of enterprises being transformed. The ministry has prepared, therefore, a guide for ownership transformation of public utilities, for the benefit of gmina councils and managers.

Role of Press in Forming Public Opinion Examined

92EP0096A Warsaw KONFRONTACJE in Polish
No 9 1991 p 22

[Article by Wieslaw Wladyka: "Newspapers and Politics"]

[Text] Public opinion is generated by newspapers, by somehow playing on the emotional chords of the readers, but at the same time also shaping their thoughts and feelings. It also has happened that they succeeded in

creating public opinion and public mood and imposing on the public their way of thinking, even if this met with protests from the competitors and the constituencies resenting such importunate social engineering techniques.

Along with the changes in the political system and social order, a new factor has appeared in Poland in the form of public opinion. This term is being variously interpreted, often as a poll, as a sample of "what people are really thinking." What people are thinking becomes public once this is made known to others. The very presentation of the obtained data is a political act—it harms some and benefits others; it may be convenient at the moment, but less convenient in the future.

But public opinion is also, and above all, the news media (radio and television), the "fourth power" of the democratic system. The press readily advertises itself as a natural mass medium reflecting human aspirations, although in reality it is quite different. It is not the reader who edits newspapers; it is the editors who do. Newspapers say what they want, but they do it publicly, and thus they generate public opinion. Of course, I am exaggerating a little, because publishing a newspaper which does not meet the interests and needs of the readers, and therefore is not bought and read, in the long run defeats its purpose.

Public opinion is generated by newspapers, of course by playing on the emotional chords of the readers, but also at the same time shaping their thoughts and feelings. It also has happened that they succeeded in creating public opinion and public mood and imposing on the public their way of thinking, even if this met with protests from the competitors and the constituencies resenting such importunate social engineering techniques. That was the case, e.g., in the early 1930's in Poland, during the investigation and subsequent trial of Rita Gorgonowa, when major press concerns unleashed an unprecedented campaign of accusations against her, presuming in advance her guilt as a murderess. Marian Dabrowski, the proprietor of the Krakow Press Palace, spared no funds (he published to this end a special afternoon daily, TEMPO DNIA, and that was also when "The Secret Detective" commenced its infamous career) to take advantage of that affair. It can be said that he had terrorized public opinion or shaped it, even though the more sophisticated press rang the tocsin.

This example points to the complicated reality of democratic pluralism, in which—even if anyone can proclaim publicly his beliefs—power and money are important and often decisive arguments.

Newspapers may be published for two reasons, ideological or commercial. The ideological factor is present when someone or some grouping considers it important to publicize its program, and the commercial when a newspaper is published principally in order to make a profit, because newspaper publishing is also a business enterprise. Properly speaking, as the experience of interwar Poland [1919-39] has shown, it is never possible to publish a newspaper with an explicit political message and still make

money on it. It has to be subsidized by somebody and it can hardly ever reach any big circulation figures.

The paradox is that the dailies of the interwar period [1919-39] that are cited in footnotes to research studies of the politics and society of that era, had actually been published in relatively small editions (several thousand or some 15,000 copies), while the sensational dailies ignored by scholars and treated as unimportant had reached the mass reader who, as a rule, used to read nothing else (Marian Dabrowski's *ILUSTROWANY KURIER CODZIENNY* had a circulation of as much as 200,000). Yet, these deliberately apolitical newspapers played the political game. First, because it was good for business: They adapted themselves to the laws governing the seemingly free market of politics and served whoever was stronger. Nearly all the big concerns after 1926 [after Pilsudski's coup d'etat] supported the Sanacja regime sooner or later, although during the feverish days of the May [1926] coup itself they sounded fiercely outraged and rent their garments in defense of political liberties. Second, again because it was good for business: This concerned adapting their reading matter to the fictitious but ultimately actual mass reader. And therefore, they promoted hurrah-patriotism, populism—as we would term it nowadays—with its slogans of justice and protection against the rich, militant Catholicism, and backward traditions. For all that, these newspapers were edited very well and in an up-to-date manner, [they were] attractive, and geared to big-city readers, thereby also influencing the countryside.

What conclusions does all this entail nowadays for us in Poland?

The political struggle for the press is already under way and will intensify; it will be chiefly a struggle for television, that being the most popular of the mass media.

This struggle concerns gaining control over the already existing publications with a regular readership, and often newspapers lacking any political traditions. All kinds of morning and evening "expresses" can be more useful in political campaigns than newly established party newspapers.

The press may be a source of substantial income, and this truth is equally important to politicians and to the still weak parties. The more so considering that the strongest newspapers will become increasingly richer and the historic trend of press concentration, i.e., of the burgeoning of successful publications followed by devouring the weaker ones, is certain to arise.

The geography of the press will be even more complex and turbid than the political geography to be recreated during, say, the election period or in a new Sejm. The press has the characteristic of pluralizing itself differently in very diverse ways.

Behind the stage of democracy a veritable drama of politics: Pressures on and blackmail of the press will be played out. There will be trading. But also, a new front of the struggle for the independence of newspapers and journalists will be opened.

The fight for a place on the press market, for press titles, for money, is not conducive to promoting genuine public opinion. This is incontestable. We have personal attacks but no confrontation of arguments. In the last two years not a single genuine mutual exchange of views took place in our press. And it seems that pluralism means not only dissent but also dialogue.

Democracy is a pretty although naive idea. And it perhaps can work only when its implementers are not naive. I think that the future of Polish democracy will depend on whether periodicals retaining their independence and capable of refraining from politicking will survive or cope on the press market.

Breakdown of Unemployment by Voivodships

92EP0064A Poznan in Polish No 42,

20 Oct 91 pp 15-18

[Article by Mariola Balicka and Maciej Luczak: "Escape From Pila; Where To Survive the Recession?"]

[Text] If you want to change your place of residence now, for God's sake don't choose Ostroleka, Rzeszow or Ciechanow, Wloclawek or Pila voivodships. They are black holes. In Ostroleka voivodship, the average salary is 1.4 to 1.6 million zlotys [Z], and there are almost 350 unemployed per job offer. In the remaining four voivodships the situation is similar. Where then, is the best place to survive the recession? In the Warsaw, Krakow, Katowice, Wroclaw, and Poznan voivodships. In Katowice voivodship one earns, on the average, from Z2.2 million to Z2.4 million, and there are no more than 50 unemployed per job offer.

A map of the Polish recession of 1991 is not uniform. There are territories and regions where the average citizen lives relatively well and looks at his future without fear. In other regions, poverty, unemployment, and fear about tomorrow are everyday problems. The differences are the result of disproportions in levels of urbanization and industrialization, and in the average productivity of labor in industry, agriculture, the construction industry, and other branches of the economy. Regional differences in quantity and quality of services, the saturation of infrastructure in particular regions, and residents' level of qualifications have a significant influence. The economical differences are also conditioned by impalpable but quite real dissimilarities in social attitudes regarding initiative, professional activity, and the ability to take risks.

Statisticians have not worked out a single synthetic indicator that could measure the material level of life. Usually we use various indicators to describe and measure it. Taking the specific situation of the Polish economy and the Polish recession under consideration, we used four indicators which allow us to measure factors determining our standard of living in 1991. Three of them concern unemployment. In a situation when galloping inflation is replaced by galloping unemployment, that same loss of a job, and the poor perspectives of being employed again, pose for a growing number of people a threat of limiting to a minimum the access to goods and services, which are components of a standard of living.

Table 1; Ranking of Voivodships

1-2	Warsaw	180
	Krakow	180
3	Katowice	175
4	Wroclaw	174
5	Poznan	172
6	Konin	158
7	Szczecin	155
8	Opole	142
9	Skierniewice	130
10	Gdansk	128
11	Chelm	125
12	Tarnobrzeg	119
13	Zielona Gora	117
14-15	Bialystok	115
	Walbrzych	115
16	Bielsko-Biala	114
17	Siedlce	111
18-19	Plock	105
	Lublin	105
20	Czestochowa	104
21	Legnica	102
22	Slupsk	100
23	Jelenia Gora	98
24	Leszno	97
25	Bydgoszcz	96
26	Kielce	95
27	Kalisz	94
28	Piotrkow	92
29	Zamosc	91
30	Biala Podlaska	90
31	Olsztyn	82
32-33	Radom	81
	Tarnow	81
34	Torun	79
35-36	Elblag	77
	Lodz	77
37	Krosno	75
38	Przemysl	72
39	Suwalki	71
40	Nowy Sacz	67
41	Lomza	66
42	Gorzow	65
43	Koszalin	61
44	Sieradz	60
45	Ostroleka	52
46	Rzeszow	50
47	Ciechanow	38
48	Wloclawek	34
49	Pila	33

Together with an indicator of unemployment (the ratio of the number of unemployed to the total professionally active population), which measures the density of this factor in individual voivodships, we took under consideration the rate of growth of unemployment, and an indicator of the number of unemployed per job offer, which describes the chances for reemployment. We do not need to explain the influence of the fourth indicator, average salary, on standard of living. We also can assume that the prices of consumption goods, which have an obvious influence on the standard of living, are to a high degree equalized by the free flow of goods between voivodships. Two additional indicators—the growth of the amount of private partnerships, and of industrial firms which are owned by natural persons—do not define standard of living directly, but in a situation where collapsing state companies are the main producers of unemployment, the rate of formation of new private companies has an ever greater influence on the level of employment and earnings.

The unemployment indicators are proof of quite a large gap between the situations of individual voivodships. For the best off, Warsaw voivodship, the unemployment index is 4.7 times smaller than that for the worst, Suwalki voivodship [see Table 2]. In the five voivodships that are least touched by the plague of unemployment, this index is three times lower than that in the five last voivodships. Voivodships with the highest level of urbanization and industrialization (Warsaw voivodship: 3.6 percent; Krakow, 4.9 percent; Poznan, 5.3 percent; Katowice, 5.4 percent; Wroclaw, 6.0 percent) are in a clearly privileged situation. The exception from this principle are: Walbrzych (13.7 percent) and Lodz (15.1 percent) voivodships. Three of those voivodships which suffer the most from unemployment are located in the northeastern and eastern parts of Poland: Ciechanow (15.8 percent), Olsztyn (16.5 percent), and Suwalki (16.9 percent) voivodships.

Table 2; Unemployment Index (31 August 1991)

Unemployment Index (percent)	Number of Voivodships	Voivodships
0-3.0	—	—
3.1-6.0	5	Warsaw, Krakow, Poznan, Katowice, Wroclaw
6.1-9.0	7	Opole, Bielsko-Biala, Chelm, Siedlce, Biala Podlaska, Szczecin, Tarnow
9.1-12.0	17	Gdansk, Skierniewice, Zamosc, Tarnobrzeg, Leszno, Lublin, Nowy Sacz, Sieradz, Czestochowa, Kielce, Radom, Kalisz, Bialystok, Rzeszow, Konin, Przemysl, Krosno
12.1-15.0	14	Zielona Gora, Legnica, Bydgoszcz, Torun, Lomza, Pila, Piotrkow, Walbrzych, Plock, Wloclawek, Gorzow, Slupsk, Elblag, Ostroleka
15.1-18.0	6	Lodz, Jelenia Gora, Ciechanow, Koszalin, Olsztyn, Suwalki

The rate of growth of unemployment between April and the end of August of this year [see Table 3] was 3.5 times lower in the best voivodship (Chelm: 15.5 percent) than in the worst (Ostroleka: 54.5 percent). For the five voivodships at the end of the list (Czestochowa: 51.5 percent; Leszno: 52.1 percent; Pila: 52.1 percent; Tarnow: 53.6 percent; Ostroleka: 54.5 percent), this index is on the average two and a half times higher than that for the first five (Chelm: 15.5 percent; Konin: 18.9 percent; Wroclaw: 25.9 percent; Bialystok: 26.0 percent; Krakow: 26.4 percent). The average rate of growth of unemployment for the whole country in this period was 40 percent. In absolute numbers, this means an increase of 532 thousand people.

**Table 3; Rate of Growth of Unemployment
(31 March to 31 August 1991)**

Rate of Growth of Unemployment (percent)	Number of Voivodships	Voivodships
15-20	2	Chelm, Konin
20.1-25.0	—	—
25.1-30.0	6	Bialystok, Krakow, Lomza, Poznan, Wroclaw, Zielona Gora
30.1-35.0	4	Warsaw, Biala Podlaska, Suwalki, Torun
35.1-40.0	8	Bydgoszcz, Jelenia Gora, Kalisz, Katowice, Plock, Przemysl, Tarnobrzeg, Walbrzych
40.1-45.1	15	Ciechanow, Gorzow, Kielce, Koszalin, Krosno, Legnica, Lodz, Opole, Piotrkow, Rzeszow, Siedlce, Skierniewice, Slupsk, Szczecin, Zamosc
45.1-50.0	8	Bielsko-Biala, Gdansk, Lublin, Nowy Sacz, Olsztyn, Radom, Sieradz, Wloclawek
50.1-55.0	6	Czestochowa, Elblag, Leszno, Ostroleka, Pila, Tarnow

Note: 31 March = 100 percent.

The highest number of unemployed is recorded in Katowice voivodship: 26.4 thousand; the lowest, in Chelm voivodship: 1,400 people.

The greatest, almost unbelievable differences are shown in the analysis of the amount of unemployed per job offer [see Table 4]. In the best voivodship (Warsaw: six persons) there are 56 times fewer unemployed persons per job offer than in the worst voivodship (Ciechanow: 335 persons). Between the first five (Warsaw: six persons; Katowice: seven; Wroclaw: 15; Krakow: 20; Szczecin: 21) and the last five (Rzeszow: 220 persons; Przemysl: 243; Lomza: 244; Ostroleka: 295; Ciechanow: 335) this difference is almost 20 times. That the gap is really high is shown by the fact that only 16 voivodships fall below the state average of 51 persons per job offer, while 33 voivodships are above. The worst situation is in the poorly urbanized and poorly industrialized voivodships of eastern Poland; among the 10 worst, seven are in the so-called eastern wall.

**Table 4; Number of Unemployed per Job Offer
(31 August 1991)**

Number of Unemployed per Job Offer	Number of Voivodships	Voivodships
1-50	16	Warsaw, Bielsko-Biala, Czestochowa, Gdansk, Katowice, Konin, Krakow, Leszno, Olsztyn, Opole, Poznan, Skierniewice, Slupsk, Szczecin, Wroclaw, Zielona Gora
51-100	17	Bialystok, Bydgoszcz, Chelm, Elblag, Gorzow, Jelenia Gora, Kalisz, Kielce, Lublin, Lodz, Nowy Sacz, Piotrkow, Radom, Siedlce, Walbrzych, Zamosc, Tarnow
101-150	10	Biala Podlaska, Koszalin, Krosno, Legnica, Pila, Plock, Sieradz, Suwalki, Tarnobrzeg, Torun
151-200	1	Wloclawek
201-250	3	Lomza, Przemysl, Rzeszow
251-300	1	Ostroleka
301-350	1	Ciechanow

Similar regularities are shown in the analysis of average salary [see Table 5]. Highly industrialized voivodships are in this respect clearly privileged. The best four on the list are mining voivodships. Among the worst, eastern voivodships dominate. Seven of 10 voivodships with the lowest level of salaries belong to the eastern regions.

Table 5; Average Compensation in Industry in Thousands of Zlotys (31 August 1991)

Compensation	Number of Voivodships	Voivodships
1,200-1,400	6	Chelm, Biala Podlaska, Lomza, Rzeszow, Nowy Sacz, Sieradz
1,401-1,600	27	Kalisz, Pila, Zamosc, Wloclawek, Przemysl, Gorzow, Torun, Bialystok, Ciechanow, Siedlce, Radom, Kielce, Suwalki, Leszno, Zielona Gora, Krosno, Skierniewice, Tarnow, Bielsko-Biala, Koszalin, Lodz, Olsztyn, Lublin, Bydgoszcz, Slupsk, Piotrkow, Czestochowa
1,601-1,800	11	Jelenia Gora, Wroclaw, Opole, Elblag, Poznan, Walbrzych, Tarnobrzeg, Krakow, Ostroleka, Szczecin, Warsaw
1,801-2,000	3	Gdansk, Konin, Legnica
2,001-2,200	1	Plock
2,201-2,400	1	Katowice

At first glance, the indicators of the growth of a number of private partnerships is optimistic [see Table 6]. In 33 voivodships, the rate of growth runs from 10.3 percent (Ciechanow voivodship) to 46 percent (Suwalki voivodship). Only in Leszno voivodship did the number of partnerships not increase; and in Kalisz voivodship, they decreased (38.3 percent). One should remember that in

many cases their leading positions are the result of small amount of partnerships at the outset; equally small-increases in absolute numbers yields high growth in

percents. Statistics show that most of the new partnerships are engaged in trade; the result is an insignificant influence on the job market.

Table 6; Rate of Growth of Number of Private Companies in the First Half of 1991

Rate of Growth (Percent)	Number of Voivodships	Voivodships
Less than 100.0	1	Kalisz
100.1-110.0	15	Bielsko-Biala, Krosno, Jelenia Gora, Lomza, Wloclawek, Gdansk, Poznan, Konin, Walbrzych, Koszalin, Slupsk, Pila, Torun, Sieradz, Leszno
110.1-120.0	24	Szczecin, Skierniewice, Wroclaw, Elblag, Lublin, Krakow, Ostroleka, Przemysl, Olsztyn, Katowice, Zielona Gora, Plock, Piotrkow, Czestochowa, Nowy Sacz, Tarnow, Bydgoszcz, Siedlce, Kielce, Radom, Lodz, Legnica, Gorzow, Ciechanow
120.1-130.0	5	Opole, Chelm, Warsaw, Rzeszow, Bialystok
130.1-140.0	3	Tarnobrzeg, Biala Podlaska, Zamosc
above 140.0	1	Suwalki

Note: First Half of 1990 = 100 percent.

Demand for work forces is expressed mainly by industrial enterprises. But in this case, all the available statistics concerning the dynamics of growth of the number of companies are owned by natural persons do not give rise to optimism [see Table 7]. In as many as 22 voivodships the

amount of industrial enterprises dropped (from 0.2 percent in Szczecin voivodship to 21.1 percent in Przemysl voivodship). In Krosno voivodship, the amount did not change; in other 22 voivodships the increase did not surpass 10 percent (from 0.5 percent in Zielona Gora voivodship to 9.2 percent in Wroclaw voivodship).

Table 7; Rate of Growth of Number of Industrial Factories That Are the Property of Natural Persons (First Half of 1991)

Rate of Growth (percent)	Number of Voivodships	Voivodships
Less than 90	1	Przemysl
90.1-100	22	Kielce, Czestochowa, Sieradz, Jelenia Gora, Rzeszow, Plock, Slupsk, Nowy Sacz, Bialystok, Opole, Walbrzych, Lodz, Lublin, Suwalki, Lomza, Warsaw, Kalisz, Piotrkow, Leszno, Bielsko-Biala, Szczecin, Krosno
100.1-110	22	Zielona Gora, Elblag, Olsztyn, Poznan, Legnica, Torun, Koszalin, Pila, Siedlce, Wloclawek, Tarnobrzeg, Krakow, Katowice, Zamosc, Biala Podlaska, Gdansk, Radom, Skierniewice, Ciechanow, Chelm, Tarnow, Wroclaw
Above 110	4	Gorzow, Bydgoszcz, Konin, Ostroleka

Note: First Half of 1990 = 100 percent.

Only four voivodships recorded a growth of more than 10 percent (Gorzow: 10.3 percent; Bydgoszcz: 11.0 percent; Konin: 12.7 percent; Ostroleka: 13.8 percent). It is worth calling attention to the fact that of the four voivodships with the highest number of such factories in June (Warsaw: 36.4 thousand; Katowice: 27.4 thousand; Lodz: 24.2 thousand; Poznan: 20.2 thousand), two noted a decline in their number (Warsaw, of 0.8 percent, and Lodz, of 1.5 percent), and the remaining two noted only a slight rise (in Poznan, of 1.9 percent, and in Katowice, of 4.6 percent).

In which regions of Poland is poverty most painful, and in which ones relatively least bothersome? Our ranked list [see Table 1] yields an approximate answer to this question. We constructed it on the basis of the three unemployment indicators described above, and that of average salary. We gave each voivodship from 49 points (for first place on the list) to one point (for last place). The sum of points for all the indicators yielded the final position of the voivodships on the ranked list. This method is of course simplified, yet the results roughly reflect the the actual situation in individual voivodships.

Warsaw voivodship twice received 49 points: for the lowest unemployment index and for the lowest number of unemployed per job offer. For the level of average salary, Warsaw earned 44 points, and for the rate of growth of unemployment, 38 points. Krakow voivodship, which shares first place on the list, is in the first five as defined by the three unemployment indicators, and in the first 10 as regards pay. The next two "giants"—Katowice and Wroclaw voivodships—figure three times in the first five and once in the second 10. Poznan voivodship records its highest ranking for a low unemployment index (47 points), and is also in the first 10 as regards lowest growth of unemployment (43 points); it is however in the second 10 as regards level of pay (38 points). The two voivodships which end the list, Pila and Wloclawek, figure in the last 10 three times (rate of growth of unemployment, number of unemployed per job offer, and average pay), and once in the next-to-last 10 (unemployment index).

[Box, p 15]

Wlodzimierz Lecki, Poznan voivod: "In Poznan, we are returning to the ethos of the nineteenth century, and to

that era's model of work. Given a very strongly aroused local patriotism, this brings very good results. In our region, a large group of competent people, who have not only financial ambitions but who also want to do something positive for the city and the region, have come together. The location of Wielkopolska in relation to the West is also not without significance. Because trading contacts with the world are concentrated in our city, mainly thanks to the Poznan International Fair."

[Box, p 18]

Andrzej Kisielewicz, Rzeszow Voivodship Administration Director: "The reasons for our difficult situation are objective. There are very many heavy industry and arms industry factories in Rzeszow voivodship, more than in other regions of Poland. They were overwhelmingly oriented toward export to the USSR. Serious difficulties began from the moment of the breakdown of the Eastern market.

"The Ministry of Industry is the founding organ for almost all the factories that are now in a very difficult situation. Recently Minister Bochniarz, on a visit to Rzeszow, promised some funds for their restructuring, yet one still cannot find in government policy a complex vision for resolving this problem. The government's decisions are, as a rule, forced, or taken under the threat of the 'strike pistol.'

"Our local budget—as is so in the whole country—has no funds to change the profile of industrial production. We are therefore entirely at the mercy, or lack of mercy, of Warsaw."

Ministry Blamed for Lack of Industrial Policy

92EP0079A Opole TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish
7 Nov 91 p 5

[Article by Halina Maleszewska: "Speculation: Industrial Policy After the Elections"]

[Text] When Minister Zawislak was removed (with his permission) in favor of Minister Bochniarz, the former was faulted for not having presented a program of industrial policy. Professor Zawislak claimed, however, that he indeed had such a program, but that the economic policy of Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz made the conduct of any industrial policy whatsoever impossible.

It is true that during Minister Zawislak's tenure, a lengthy document entitled "State Industrial Policy" was prepared. Yet it was never introduced, nor even examined by the appropriate bodies. It is unknown, therefore, whether these were good or bad proposals. The fact is that there has been no industrial policy in Poland in recent years.

The Third Republic began with the programmatic assumption that the best industrial policy is no policy. Good enterprises will protect themselves, and the bad ones will fall. And this is the problem. It turned out that this doctrine of "constructive destruction," born in the Ministry of Finance, brought Polish industry to ruin. Today, Hans Szyk, general director of Gdansk Shipyard Corp, states, in answer to a question from GAZETA BANKOWA that if an industrial policy had been outlined two years ago, the shipyard would most certainly be in much better

condition than it is now, and that it is difficult to answer the question of how to get out of this situation.

Among economic experts, there is no doubt that the state must conduct an active economic policy. Prof. Andrzej Kozminski, president of the International Management School, says that a government that abandons such policy during an economic crisis dooms the country to catastrophe. Countries that did not allow themselves to be led astray by the free market ideology and international experts, and actively supported and protected domestic industry, accomplished an "economic miracle" (Japan, the Asian "tigers," Taiwan). On the other hand, those which obediently acceded to alien advice and pressures, like the countries of South America, are today in an even worse situation that when they began reforming the economy.

There is no doubt that we are closer to Bolivia than to South Korea. What can we do in this situation, if we do not want to agree with the assumption that it is too late for anything? Theoreticians and practitioners maintain that first it is necessary to cease the ruining of state enterprises through destructive taxes (the "popiwek" tax on above the plan growth of wages and taxes on dividends). Financial tools which destroy must be replaced by those which help. Professor Kaleta, for example, includes in this arsenal tax abatements and exemptions, preferential bank credits (in South Korea, for example, enterprises for 25 years had access to negative-interest credits), and budgetary subsidies for scientific research and the introduction of new technologies.

The financial stimuli in use today do not do what they are supposed to do. They concentrate exclusively on the support of privatization as an end in itself. No one, of course, denies the sense of privatization. But the experts understand it differently than do the centers of power: Not as a selling off of everything one can, at any price, but as a judicious and, if necessary, long-term process whose higher goal is the good of the Polish economy.

Not only the man on the street is afraid that the West will buy us for nothing, an idea which "official circles" rebut with the fact that the West is not at all eager to do so. Experts also recognize that we must change our relations with the West. This means a sober evaluation of the competitive chances of Polish industry in foreign markets (some branches of industry are able to meet that competition), and a sober evaluation of the policies of our foreign partners and of foreign financial organizations. Those who govern Poland are often charged with naivete in business matters. There can even be heard in this country warnings that the West is consciously ruining our industry so that it does not become competitive in foreign markets.

Before the election, there appeared more or less as many programs for rescuing the economy as there were political parties. These programs are often lengthy documents which no one read. Voters, and only a few of them, know these programs only from parliamentary candidates' television appearances. All the programs were presented as slogans; they sounded the same, which fact is surely a result of the election game. Unfortunately, we did not get to experience a discussion, transmitted on television, between those economists who hide behind those party programs. Thus it was difficult to choose rationally, in appreciation of a program, rather than based on feeling

toward candidates or even on the talents of the advertising professionals preparing the election programs of various parties.

Probably the only attempt at comparing face to face the merits of individual parties and associations seeking to govern Poland was made by Labor Solidarity. It organized a debate to which it invited the post-Solidarity groups. The most important of these, the Democratic Union, the Center Accord, and the Liberal Democratic Congress, didn't come. They did not invite the postcommunists, probably for fear being suspected of searching for allies. Only the Catholic Election Action acceded to a joint preelection debate with the Democratic Left Alliance, but no one will ever suspect Representative Niesiolowski of fraternizing with candidate Miller.

Why, however, "the good guys" did not come to the Warsaw debate either, is a more difficult question to answer. Surely not for personal reasons. Did they fear a fight over programs? Did they perhaps recognize that a preelection program, and the program which follows after electoral victory, might be two completely different programs? Maybe then it is not worth it to make public promises which can then be more easily verified? Or maybe there simply were no programs which were worth presenting in entirety, especially to experts from competing parties and groups? At any rate, the fact that this is how things turned out does not bode well for the future.

Dr. Ryszard Bugaj, chair of the Sejm Commission on the Economy, Budget, and Finances in the previous parliament, maintains that there has recently been some rapprochement between the economic programs of Labor Solidarity and the Democratic Union. Jacek Kuron speaks of an active industrial policy and equality of sectors. Labor Solidarity is even closer to the Center Accord's program. Professor Stefan Kurowski goes even further in his economic postulates than does Representative Bugaj. In fact, however, there are various individuals in both the Democratic Union and the Center Accord, with various views about the economy. And it is unknown whom each party will choose to pilot the economy, should it join the government. In the case of the Democratic Union, Osiatynski (in favor of changes) would have a different program from that of Dabrowski (continuation). The same is true for the Center Accord. If economic policy is entrusted to Professor Kurowski, one can expect deep changes from the present situation. If it is entrusted to Professor Winiecki, then only Balcerowicz himself would be replaced.

On the other hand, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the leader of the Center Accord, averred, in *ZYCIE WARSZAWY*, that his party would not join a government which would pursue Balcerowicz's policy. It would join any government which would change that policy, regardless of who formed that government, except for the postcommunists, though the Accord's leader does not hide his lack of feeling, undoubtedly mutual, toward the Democratic Union.

The situation did not change after the election. On the contrary: It looks rather as if a rapprochement of position

will be significantly harder than one could have judged from the preelection games. Not only programmatic differences have emerged, but also political (such success by the Left Democratic Alliance was not expected, and no one really knows how to deal with the matter) and personal differences. Future parliamentary coalitions are a great mystery. The shape of the future government is unknown. The more so, then, is it unknown what policy the new government will pursue. The dilemma of whether to go on with Balcerowicz or without him (meant more symbolically than personally) has yet to be resolved, yet more points to continuing with him, as our foreign advisers and creditors expect.

Can we therefore expect a conscious, centrally outlined economic policy, including an industrial policy, or will we continue to travel the road toward a free market chaotically? Our experiences until now show that there must in the end be an economic policy; otherwise the recession will deepen to the point, some predict, of economic catastrophe.

The election results show that society does not accept the processes now taking place. The election results can be treated as a warning to those forces that hold power in Poland. History teaches that when the government has fallen into conflict with the people, it is the government that has changed, not the people. It is high time to draw conclusions from the recent, and the not-so-recent, past.

Rural Policy, Productivity Reviewed, Critiqued
92EP0067A Warsaw SPOTKANIA in Polish No 38,
2 Oct 91 pp 18-19

[Article by Elzbieta Eysymontt: "From Peasant Dance to Strikes"]

[Text] It seems paradoxical that the countryside, an enclave of the private economy in the PRL [Polish People's Republic], is the worst off under the private Republic, at least in its own eyes. It is probably no great exaggeration to say that no consistent postwar policy has ever been formulated for agriculture and the rural areas.

Reality usually betrayed the publicly announced slogans. From the days of Gomulka on through the era of Gierek and Jaruzelski, peasants heard about their importance and their historic mission to feed the nation. "A green light for agriculture," "Every hectare must be productive," "We must feed ourselves," "We support a single type of agriculture, good agriculture," "Food is a strategic weapon." These transparent declarations usually appeared after each successive crisis in the government and were intended to placate both rural and urban areas. Appeasement involved promises of forced growth that were never completely carried out, but all this was stored in the unconscious, and hopes remained that the rural areas could only benefit, once something about the whole economy changed. They could never lose out.

It is said that Polish agriculture is backward, and it could actually be put into Europe's Skansen Museum. The main feature of this inequality is the fact that there are so many little farms. More than three-quarters of all the farm land

is in private hands, and more than half the farms are no larger than five hectares in size. In comparison, such small farms make up only 24 percent in France and the Netherlands, 31 percent in the FRG, 28 percent in Belgium, and 2 percent in Denmark. Within Europe, Greece and Italy have a larger percentage of very small farms than Poland does (over 68 percent).

Farmland and Orchards Per Capita (in Hectares)

Poland	0.5
Denmark	0.5
France	0.6
Greece	0.4
Netherlands	0.06
Japan	0.04
United States	1.8 F
Former GDR	0.3
FRG	0.12
Sweden	0.4
Former USSR	2.1

These tiny Polish farms produce more rye and potatoes (per capita) than these other countries do, however. In terms of wheat, rye, meat, and milk production though, they rank somewhere in the middle for Europe. Things are worse with yield size and the productivity of dairy cows. Here Poland loses out in any comparison with the advanced countries, but the levels of consumption of crop-building substances like fertilizers and pesticides is far lower in Poland too.

The ratios of people employed directly in agriculture and serving agriculture are also reversed in those countries, where there are several people providing agricultural services for each farmer, while in Poland not long ago each statistical farmer lost an average of three months per year handling business in agencies and institutions created to make his life easier. Every time a peasant drove into town, he became aware of his importance in terms of food shortages. One government after the other faced lines in front of butcher shops. It is true that the peasant himself did not have much, but he could at least believe that he would see better times once there was a change in government leadership. When the government changed, it suddenly turned out that we had come into an economy of surpluses. A miracle had occurred. It became obvious that even now we were able to feed ourselves, that it could be more profitable to import cheaper food from abroad, that we had too much land and ran into problems selling farm crops, especially because of the inefficiency of the state food and agriculture industry, which always suffered from underinvestment.

The existence of farm producers was threatened. A struggle ensued this time, not over income parity between the rural population and people employed outside agriculture, but over daily existence. The latest data from GUS [Central Office of Statistics] show that more than 38 percent of the

entire population lives in the countryside. Work in agriculture supports nearly 6 million people (those working in agriculture and their families), and this figure includes nearly half a million families of people employed on state farms. Most of them have no alternative at the moment to working on a farm. There is unemployment and a shortage of housing in the cities. In the countryside, there are no nonagricultural jobs. Only the farm can still shelter and feed people, and it has to absorb them, because unemployment has hit the so-called "peasant workers" especially hard.

Farm income has never kept pace with the price of the means of production. Each year, more grain, meat, and milk had to be sold to buy the essentials. Prices of services have been rising disproportionately. Last year the rural areas suffered an especially severe decline in real income. There is clear impoverishment. Any sort of rural production investment has dwindled, largely because of the sky-high interest rates on credit. The consumption of fertilizers and pesticides has declined drastically. The harvest festival, if it was celebrated anywhere other than Jasna Gora, was not a joyful harvest holiday. What was there to be thankful for? Many state farms did not sow rape in their fields. Straw was not collected. All the stubble was not plowed under. Not every hectare needs to have a yield. The state farm employees became afraid. It is true that wages have been steadily declining recently, but they were still higher than unemployment benefits. On one state farm near Slupsk, a combine harvester's family of five (the two working parents plus three small children) had a monthly income of 2.1 million zlotys [Z] during the harvest. In other months, when there was no combine overtime, there is less money.

Role of Polish Agriculture in Creating National Income (percent)

1984	14
1985	15
1990	7.5

The political and economic changes in Poland in 1990 and 1991 created greater disparities in the rural areas than at any other time. The three peasant parties and several other smaller groups, Private Farmers' Solidarity, and the National Union of Agrarian Circles and Farm Organizations fight on behalf of peasant and rural affairs. The countryside has its own small group of representatives in the "contract" Sejm. The only question is how strong they are, because they surely are loud. The Sejm debates over agriculture, which are lengthy and consist mainly of repeating the same grievances in different versions, are usually held in an empty room, where interested parties speak to other interested parties, convinced that they will convince the convinced. The agricultural interests have no leader of the stature of Wincenty Witos, who was able to convince the people in power of the dramatic undeserved situation of the rural population. On the other hand, those who consider themselves to be Witos' contemporaries, offer little more than demagoguery.

100 Liters of Fuel Oil Had a Value in 1990 Equal to:

(1989 data given in parentheses)

2.6 quintals of wheat	(1.7)
3.5 quintals of rye	(2.4)
27 kilograms hogs for slaughter	(23)
337 liters of milk	(149)

An Ursus Tractor Had a Value Equal to:

(1989 data given in parentheses)

363 quintals of wheat	(201)
484 quintals of rye	(273)
3,693 kilograms of hogs for slaughter	(2,698)
46,712 liters of milk	(17,144)

Deputy Prime Minister Balcerowicz is considered public enemy number one in the Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments. The peasants say that he has the rural areas on a short tether and that he could let out the reins. Protests against the government are aimed at forcing the finance minister to ease up, because it lies within his jurisdiction to put high enough tariffs on food imports to make it unprofitable for anyone to import food from the West. He could also lower interest rates and adopt minimum prices for buying up farm crops. The farmers repeat these three demands over and over, phrasing them in different ways. They do not always coincide with the law, because although peasant dances were the main past time of peasants at one time, after the gmina cooperatives, wholesale centers, agencies, and institutions, today they specialize in strikes, boycotts, occupying buildings, and pouring crops in front of the doors of the government offices.

In their demands, the farmers often refer to the example of farm subsidies in Common Market countries. They are usually silent regarding the fact that the payment there is also to encourage production. Recent government decisions address some rural proposals, but not to a satisfactory degree. The key issue is promising to assign Z1.6 trillion for investment credit at preferential interest rates to modernize farms. The annual interest rate on this credit cannot exceed 24 percent. The second issue is minimum pricing. Things are worse for this proposal. The Ministry of Agriculture is against them, but the arguments boil down to the fact that intermediaries will be the chief beneficiaries. Farmers will gain little or nothing, and consumers will be the losers, because food will cost them more. The government budget must therefore subsidize this undertaking with Z14-18 trillion. To raise tariffs, on the other hand, would place in question Poland's joining the Common Market.

One of the elements of the agreement on joining is the creation of a free trade area and, among other things, liberalization of trade in food and agricultural products. In the course of a recent TV broadcast, during a conversation between the president and enterprise directors, Lech Walesa offered these two pieces of advice, among others:

"Peasants, save yourselves, if you can," and "Peasants, things are the way they are." These statements can probably apply equally well to agriculture and the rural areas.

[Box, p 19]

Forecast for Next Year Developed by Agriculture Ministry Experts

Rye. The market price will not cover production costs. The possibility of expanding exports is uncertain. Rye is of fundamental importance in the processing of fodder.

Wheat. There will be increased demand for wheat without gluten. World market prices will increase. There is the possibility of exporting about 400,000 tons, 100,000 tons more than in 1991. Donations have ceased, making stock on hand one-quarter the level of fiscal year 1990/91. Domestic prices could increase by even more than 40 percent of current prices.

Hogs. Numbers will be at 1991 levels, that is, about 22 million hogs. The meat supply may be nearly 20 percent higher, but the price will not permit any increase in domestic consumption of pork. Export possibilities are limited.

Beef. This June, the number of head was 11 percent below last year. Beef production may therefore be 15 percent lower. EEC barriers limit export possibilities. Increased domestic prices cannot be counted on.

Milk. During the first half of 1991, wholesale purchase of milk was 21 percent below last year, and butter production was about 28 percent lower. Annual butter consumption reached 6.5 kilograms per year capita in 1990 (compared to 8.9 in 1989) and will remain at this level. There is likely to be a shortage of nearly 15,000 tons, which may drive up prices.

Photo Caption

1. p. 19: In 1990, there were 18,720 hectares of farmland, 14,228 hectares of which was in private hands.

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92EP0068B Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 44,
2 Nov 91 p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

[passage omitted] At the Sejm and the Belweder, the miners protested: They demanded that the president use his veto and not sign the retirement law. In a letter to the Convention of Seniors, the unions of the Federation of Trade Unions of Miners demanded that the Sejm criticize itself. Bronislaw Geremek commented on the letter: "If in England, the unionists wrote a similar letter to Parliament, they would never get out of debt. This letter, full of threats and insults, would be regarded as a crime and a court would impose high fines."

The Supreme Chamber of Control audited the Ursus factory: In 1990, the factory still had a profit of 85.5 billion zlotys [Z]; at the end of June 1991, the debt was Z742

billion, and at the end of August 1991, it was Z902 billion. In 1990, the price of the tractors increased five-fold, and in February 1991 by another 15 percent. According to the Supreme Chamber of Control, the factory lost Z100 billion on the contract with Art-B. The Supreme Chamber of Control said that the cause of the factory's debt are mistakes by the management in the operation of the enterprise. Henryk Szczygiel, the former manager, does not share this opinion and is demanding a percentage of the profits for 1990 and threatening to sue if he does not receive it. Szczygiel was chosen manager in June 1990 by the Workers' Council—dominated, as GAZETA WYBORCZA writes, by old Solidarity factory activists.

The Pentor Institute conducted a survey on the subject of the most important problems facing the country for ZYCIE WARSZAWY: 66 percent of the respondents mentioned unemployment; 46 percent agriculture; 29 percent the decline in production; 26 percent crime and disorder; 22 percent incompetent privatization; 21 percent housing problems; 17 percent bad education, the health service, and culture; 17 percent corruption and favoritism; 14 percent environmental pollution; 2 percent bad relations with neighboring states. [passage omitted]

Treasury payments for applications and documents issued by authorities rose an average of 70 percent. For example, the payment for applications is Z5,000 plus Z500 for each attachment. [passage omitted]

"Gasoline for the Poor" is the title of an article in GAZETA WYBORCZA reporting that customs agents in Szczecin have stopped 5,000 tons of 94-octane gasoline sent as a "gift for the poor and the handicapped" of the parish of St. Barbara in Magnuszewice near Kotlin. In turn, a Danish donor sent 21 truckloads for the partnership Uni Petrol in Wloclawek in the name of the Association for the Apostolic Life "Deeds in the Service of God's Mercy" from Czestochowa. The Customs Office sees no reason to recognize the demands of the parish and of the Association to exempt them from the several billion in duties.

A report of the Central Planning Administration on foreign trade: In foreign trade calculated in convertible currencies the percentage of the state sector over the eight months of 1991 was 87.4 percent of exports and 56.8 percent of imports. The private sector had 12.6 percent of the exports and 43.2 percent of the imports. The balance of the state sector during the period was positive and amounted to \$2.442 million; that of the private sector was negative and amounted to \$2.594 million.

Prior to the election, priests received instructions on which group to vote for. GAZETA WYBORCZA wrote about this story and mentions the instruction lists as No. 7, the Christian Democracy; No. 12, the Citizens' Center Accord; No. 13, the Peasant Movement "Peasants Accord" (Slisz and Janowski), No. 17, the Catholic Election Action; No. 61, the Party of Christian Democrats. GAZETA WYBORCZA drew attention to the fact that according to the position of the Episcopate, the church "does not indicate any preelection lists." The Press Office of the

Episcopate did not confirm or deny the existence of such instructions. [passage omitted]

A court in Lodz has awarded Waldemar Wagner Z727 million in damages for his years of imprisonment during Stalinist times. He was in prison for six years and two months. The verdict is final. (DZIENNIK LODZKI)

Two press and publishing initiatives. PRZEKROJ published a 48-page special edition "Lwow and Its Residents" (recollections, and a large selection of pictures). GAZETA POLICYJNA has published a special issue on the fate of police functionaries in the Charkov-Mednoye camps. Price Z8,500. [passage omitted]

Opinions

[passage omitted]

Bogumil Rychlowski of the Polish Institute of International Affairs:

(SPRAWY MIEDYNARODOWE, No. 8)

"One can draw the conclusion that the centuries-old contest between Poland and Russia for influence in the areas that long were part of the Republic, has unequivocally ended: After the defeat of Poland, the current defeat of Russia. The peoples of those areas, i.e., Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Lithuania, are finally gaining their sovereignty. Wanting to strengthen their national and cultural identity, they will be sensitive to any signs of special commissions or civilizing missions by their neighbors. Thus, one should assume relations as full partners and respect of their differences."

Piotr Lukasiewicz, journalist:

(KRYTYKA, No. 30)

"The political biographies of many public figures begin in 1980 or later—what they did earlier is politely forgotten (unless they had a history of opposition activity). If we can read in the press of one woman deputy that she once joined the ZSL [United Peasant Party] in order not to join the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] and clearly she regards that act as one of civic courage, then it is not strange that people are seeking out Urban. His demonism in this case consists, for example, in revealing that X in the 1970's worked for POLITYKA, and Y recited for the first secretary. If the PRL [Polish People's Republic] past in which each of us in some way soiled his or her hands continues to be mystified, then future generations will consider cooperation with POLITYKA to be as vile and embarrassing as cooperation with the security services. So be it, since we ourselves are unable to tell ourselves various none-too-pleasant things, we must hear them from Urban." [passage omitted]

POLITYKA Weekly News Roundup: 3-9 Nov
92EP0068C Warsaw *POLITYKA* in Polish No 45,
9 Nov p 2

[Excerpts]

National News

[passage omitted] In a preelection declaration, President L. Walesa stated that the following were the main tasks facing a new government:

- 1. Broad privatization and control of the recession.
- 2. The issue of managing unemployment.
- 3. National security and settling crimes.
- 4. Health, culture, and social policy. [passage omitted]

Mining Solidarity has initiated a dispute with the government: It gave the cause as the government side repeatedly rejecting Solidarity's proposals and those agreed upon not being implemented. [passage omitted]

On 31 October, Minister J. Eysymontt of the Central Planning Administration presented a warning prognosis to journalists. In 1992, if current trends continue, the GNP will decline by 5 percent. The inflation rate will be 47 percent, and if the new government attempts to stimulate the economy it will increase to 70 percent. The Central Planning Administration estimates the budget deficit at 50 billion to 60 billion zlotys [Z]. Unemployment will probably increase to 3.5 million. A negative balance of trade of more than \$1 billion should be expected.

On Leszek Balcerowicz, according to the Public Opinion Research Center, 21 percent of the respondents think that continued implementation of his program will give Poland more good than bad; 37 percent the reverse, more bad than good. Another 37 percent, as much bad as good; 27 percent of the respondents would give him the same or even a higher position (prime minister) in the new government; 26 percent would give him a lower position; 27 percent would not agree to having him in a government.

The Japanese offered the Great Theater in Warsaw audio-visual and amplifying equipment worth 45 million yen (about Z3.8 billion).

The prime minister has told Wieslaw Chrzanowski, the minister of justice, to develop a list of those actions during the election campaign which bear the marks of a crime (libel, slander, agitation at an illegal time and place). A government spokesman announced that the prosecutor is studying "vulgar, anti-Semitic contents in the election program of the National Party." [passage omitted]

The social minimum for a single person, according to calculations by KURIER POLSKI based on studies of the

Institute of Labor and Social Policy, was Z977,000 in October 1991. For a family of four, the monthly minimum was Z3.172 million. A single retired person needed Z870,000. The minimum costs of support are 50-percent higher than the officially set minimum wage and retirement. [passage omitted]

Opinions

Prof. Jerzy Jedlicki, historian:

(*GAZETA WYBORCZA*, 31 October-1 November)

"Although it might be an unpopular view, I do not think that the Alliance of the Democratic Left is an extremist group. They themselves called themselves social democrats. To be sure, at first that may have only been a protective coloration. The election results showed, however, that they are a part of the political spectrum, and it would be foolish to treat them as plague infested. I regard aggressive attitudes towards them as damaging; such attitudes could push them in the wrong direction. I think, that on the contrary, one should support their evolution, including and habituating them so that with time they change themselves into a genuine social democracy."

Prof. Jadwiga Staniszkis, sociologist:

(*WYBRZEZE*, 22 November)

"I think that East Europe has not yet entered the phase of sharp nationalisms. It is only just beginning. And I assume that they will not be nationalisms favoring development. The Belorussian people until recently did not even have their own literary language. One can expect they will mythologize their own past at an accelerated rate in order to confirm their own political separateness. If there are disputed questions between Belorussia and Lithuania, it could happen that they would be defused by additional claims against our eastern boundaries. We should count on similar problems along the border with the Ukraine. I think that is nearly unavoidable." [passage omitted]

Ryszard Bugaj, chairman of the Deputy Club of Solidarity of Labor:

(Interviewed by T. Maarz, *TYGODNIK SIEDLECKI*, 13 October)

"Our relation to the postcommunist groups is completely clear. We do not intend to cooperate with any institution that derives from the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]. There remains the issue of particular individuals. In the charter, we want to include a provision stating that no one may join the association who actively participated in combatting the democratic opposition. And as regards others? Yesterday, we decided that, not without some amazement, I am the only chairman of a deputy club in the Sejm who never was in the PZPR or in any satellite party in the past."

Editorial Sees West's Back Turned on Croatia

92GE0101A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Nov 91 p 1

[Article by Johann Georg Reissmueller: "Abandoned by the Nations"]

[Text] Politicians of the Western world have shamefully failed in the face of the Serbian war against Croatia. But what about the nations, the people? They did not want to take note of the fact that this war is a war of annihilation against a nation in Europe; rather, they looked at it as an inexplicable occurrence in a distant part of the world.

Yet neither location nor victims are far away. Millions of people from all countries of Central and West Europe have spent their vacations in Croatia during the past decades. They met Croats at the vacation resorts, formed acquaintances and sometimes friendships. Millions of people in Central and West Europe are dealing daily with Croats who are here as workers, engineers, physicians, businessmen. The network of such relations must be especially dense in Germany, where so many Croats live far from home as in no other European country.

Should protest not have raged like a storm through the continent when the Serbian "people's army" assaulted defenseless Croatia with its tanks, cannons, and planes, or at least when the Serbian conquerors demolished Croatian cities with their hospitals and churches, when they cruelly tortured and murdered Croatian civilians and soldiers? Should the peoples in West Europe not have overwhelmed their governments with accusations of inaction, should they not have accused those in government of the omission of assistance and threatened them with being voted out on the next occasion?

Nothing like that. The people looked the other way, like their politicians. Nowhere has a party lost an election because of its so-called Yugoslavia policy. Nowhere did people withdraw from a party, or at least threaten it, for Croatia's sake. Nowhere has a politician resigned from office because of Croatia.

Particularly striking was the lack of church solidarity, so long in coming. The Croats are among the columns of the Catholic global church. In Germany, but also in other countries, there have existed for decades Croat Catholic parishes whose life is closely linked to that of German Catholic parishes. But for months one waited in vain for the suffering Croatian people to be remembered in sermons, prayers, pastoral letters by the bishops. Only in the fall did some quarters of Catholic Germany wake up.

Several reasons for the apathy are common to the Western nations, can be found everywhere to a varying degree. The longing for peace has so overwhelmed people that they no longer want to take notice of a war. The right to live without weapons has crushed the duty to give armed assistance to a defenseless people fighting for life. The Germans march at the head on this wrong path. That has encumbered Bonn's policy on Croatia. Germany, together with Austria, has demanded most decisively that the free world assist the Croats. But whenever there was talk of troops, Kohl and Genscher declined; Germany could not send soldiers, not even a blue-helmeted peacekeeping force, and much less a combat unit for the protection of Croatia and Slovenia—the constitution, reasons of state, the people's will forbade it.

It is time that above all the churches examine themselves to determine whether, in spreading the peace mentality, they have not crossed the line to a peace ideology that abandons the weak to the power of the stronger. "The helpless I have not protected, I have only looked for what helps me," it says in a much-sung hymn. The Western nations have more reason than ever to contemplate this verse.

To this is added mental indolence. To this day, even many educated people carry on their debates about "Yugoslavia" with old armchair slogans such as "splintering down there cannot come to a good end." The German, Italian, British, French philistine wanted Yugoslavia, even if it was a state of terror. He covered his ears if someone explained to him that the oppression in the Yugoslav prison of nationalities threatens peace in an entire European region. It is difficult to free oneself of such deliberate errors.

In some Western countries, outmoded ideas of one's own national interest, also widespread among the public, have formed the basis for a policy against Croatia. Some Italians cannot get over the fact that, after World War II, Istria fell to Slovenia, Fiume (Rijeka) and Zara (Zadar) to Croatia. Now they rub their hands in view of Croatian misery—just as some Germans were gleeful when the Soviet Union humbled the Czechs in August 1968. In France and Great Britain, a part of the intelligentsia is still attached to the new order established for East Central Europe in 1919-20, whose primary intent was to punish Germany, Austria, and Hungary and keep them down; the greater Serbian Belgrade state was a cornerstone of this system. In turn, in the Netherlands anti-German resentments are fulfilled in the policy of Foreign Minister Van den Broek.

Indifference, mental indolence, ill will; over them, the rows of graves are growing in Croatian cemeteries, the country is being devastated. A disgrace for Europe, for the entire civilized world.

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